# $G_{\delta \sigma}$-games and generalized computation 

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#### Abstract

We show the equivalence between the existence of winning strategies for $G_{\delta \sigma}$ (also called $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ ) games in Cantor or Baire space, and the existence of functions generalized-recursive in a higher type-2 functional. (Such recursions are associated with certain transfinite computational models.)

We show, inter alia, that the set of indices of convergent recursions in this sense is a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set: as paraphrase, the listing of those games at this level that are won by player $I$, essentially has the same information as the 'halting problem' for this notion of recursion.

Moreover the strategies for the first player in such games are recursive in this sense. We thereby establish the ordinal length of monotone $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-inductive operators, and characterise the first ordinal where such strategies are to be found in the constructible hierarchy. In summary:

Theorem (a) The following sets are recursively isomorphic. (i) The complete ittm-semi-recursive-in-eJ set, $H^{\mathrm{eJ}}$; (ii) the $\Sigma_{1}$-theory of $\left(L_{\eta_{0}}, \in\right)$, where $\eta_{0}$ is the closure ordinal of $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-monotone inductions; (iii) the complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers. (b) The ittm-recursive-in-eJ sets of integers are precisely those of $L_{\eta_{0}}$.


## 1 Introduction

The attempt to prove the determinacy of two person perfect information games (and the consequences of the existence of such winning strategies) has a long and fruitful history, starting with work of Banach and Mazur and continuing to the present. The work in the paper [20] was initially motivated by trying to see how the $\Pi_{3}^{1}$-theory of arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions fits in with other subsystems of second order number theory, in particular with the determinacy of $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-sets. There it was shown, inter alia, that AQI's - which were known to be formally equivalent with the most basic form of generalized computation to be introduced below - are not strong enough to compute strategies for $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-games. What had been left open was a more precise discussion of the location of those strategies. We continue that discussion here. To give this research a context we shall also mention the results previously known in this area.

The argument in [21] explicitly extracts what was undeclared in the proof, a criterion for where exactly the strategies appear in the G del constructible $L_{\alpha}$ hierarchy. Whilst we have had this result for some while, the characterisation is somewhat unusual in that it is expressed in terms of the potential for such $L_{\alpha}$ to have certain kinds of ill-founded elementary end extensions, and is not so perspicuous. We had conjectured that certain kinds of illfounded-computation trees (defined by Lubarsky) should also characterize this ordinal. This we have verified, but now see that there is a bigger picture that connects the generalized recursion theory of the late 50 's and early 60 's of Kleene (v. [9]) of higher types with the determinacy of games at this level. To be clearer the connection is between the existence of winning strategies and the generalization of Kleene which is associated with a transfinite computational model of the so-called Infinite Time Turing machines of Hamkins and Kidder [5]. Kleene in [9] developed an equational calculus, itself evolving out of his analysis of the G del-Herbrand General Recursive Functions (on integers) fom the 1930's, but now enlarged for dealing with recursion in objects of finite type. (The set of natural numbers we denote by $\omega$ and they are of type $0 ; f: a \rightarrow \omega$ is of type $k+1$ if $a$ is of type $k$.) A particular type- 2 functional was that of the ordinary jump $J$, where

$$
\begin{aligned}
J(e, \vec{m}, \vec{x}) & =1 \text { if }\{e\}(\vec{m}, \vec{x}) \downarrow \text { (meaning converges, or is defined) } \\
& =0 \text { otherwise. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Here $\vec{m}$ is a string of integers, and $\vec{x}$ a vector of functions $f: \omega \rightarrow \omega$ (thus a vector of objects of type 1) and $\{e\}$ a usual index of a recursive function. The function under discussion is $\{e\}$ which is given by a natural number index coding its formation. In this formalism the index set

$$
H^{J}(e) \leftrightarrow\{e\}^{J}(e) \downarrow
$$

is a complete semi-recursive (in $J$ ) set of integers, and Kleene showed that this is in turn a complete $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ set of integers. Further he showed that the J-recursive sets of integers, i.e. those sets $R$ for which

$$
R(n) \leftrightarrow\{e\}^{J}(n) \downarrow 1 \wedge \neg R(n) \leftrightarrow\{e\}^{J}(n) \downarrow 0
$$

for some index $e$, are precisely the hyperarithmetic ones.

Recall that a set $X \subseteq \omega\left({ }^{\omega} \omega\right)$ is said to be in $\partial \Gamma$ for some (adequate) pointclass $\Gamma$ on the integers (Baire space), if there is a set $Y \subseteq \omega \times{ }^{\omega} \omega\left({ }^{\omega} \omega \times{ }^{\omega} \omega\right)$ so that $X=\{x \mid$ Player I has a winning strategy in $\left.G\left(Y_{x},{ }^{<\omega} \omega\right)\right\}$ where $Y_{x}=\{y \mid\langle x, y\rangle \in Y\}$. Roughly speaking, if one has a recursive listing of the $\Gamma$ sets of reals, (say from some universal $\Gamma$ set): $A_{0}, A_{1}, \ldots, A_{n}, \ldots$, then a complete $\partial \Gamma$ set of integers, gives those $n$ for which $I$ has a winning strategy in $G\left(A_{n} ;{ }^{<\omega} \omega\right)$.

We have the following theorem connecting this with determinacy of open games:
Theorem 1.1. (Moschovakis [14], Svenonius [17]) The complete $\partial \Sigma_{1}^{0}$ set of integers is a complete $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ set of integers.

Hence by Kleene's results just alluded to:

Corollary 1.2. The complete $\partial \Sigma_{1}^{0}$ set of integers is recursively isomorphic to $H^{J}$, a complete J-semidecidable set of integers.

## Moreover:

Theorem 1.3. (Blass [2]) Any $\Sigma_{1^{-}}^{0}$ game for which the open player, that is I, has a winning strategy, has a hyperarithmetic winning strategy.

Corollary 1.4. Any $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$-game for which player I has a winning strategy, has a J-recursive strategy.
We seek to raise these ideas to the level of $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$. Kleene also gave an equivalent account of recursion in objects of finite type using as an alternative the Turing model enhanced with oracle calls to a higher type functional, see [10],[11]; the account here is motivated in spirit by that approach. Instead of using an equational calculus we shall couch this in terms of infinite time Turing machines -(ittm's) computations recursive in a certain operator eJ in place of $J$. Indeed there is already a version of this kind of computation in the literature. In [12] Lubarsky defines the notion of a 'feedback'-ittm machine, where a Hamkins-Kidder ittm may call upon a sub-computation handled by another such machine, and pass an index and an element of Cantor space to it as a parameter. The information passed back is as to whether the computation with the given index acting on the given parameter halts or not (which it may do after a transfinite number of steps, in contradistinction to the standard Turing machine). This is thus in the spirit of the jump $J$ defined above. A convergent feedback-ittm computation can then be conceived as a wellfounded tree of halting sub-computations. A divergent computation ("freezing" in Lubarsky's terminology) is one which descends down an ill-founded path.

Rather than define recursions involving what would be the generalization of $J$ above to halting ittm-computations, we use an eventual jump operator eJ. The ittm's have an arguably more fundamental behaviour than 'halting' or 'non-halting': they may eventually have some settled output on their output tape without formally entering a halting state (the Read/Write head may be meandering up and down the tape, perhaps fiddling with the Scratch or Input tape, but leaving the output alone, in some fixed loop without formally halting). This 'eventual' or 'settled' behaviour fits in with the $\Sigma_{2}$ definable liminf rules of its operation. We thus define:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{eJ}(e, \vec{m}, \vec{x}) & =1 \text { if }\{e\}(\vec{m}, \vec{x}) \mid \text { (denoting converges to a settled ouput) } \\
& =0 \text { otherwise }
\end{aligned}
$$

Here $\{e\}$ is now an index of a standard ittm-computable function, say given by some usual finite programme $P_{e}(\vec{m}, \vec{x})$. We then consider ittm-computations recursive in eJ, for which we would now use the notation $\{e\}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ to denote the $e^{\prime}$ th such function recursive in eJ. Here a query instruction or state is included as part of the machine's language. For this notion we find a level of the $L$ hierarchy $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ to provide an analogy with the above.

Theorem 1.5. The complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers is recursively isomorphic to $H^{\mathrm{eJ}}$, the complete eJ-semi-decidable set of integers.

Thus to paraphrase, the listing of those games that are won by $I$, essentially has the same information as the 'halting problem' for this notion of recursion. We feel this is interesting as it demonstrates that two, prima facie very different, notions are in fact intimately connected. Define $\tau_{0}$ as the supremum of the convergence times of eJ-recursive computations.

Corresponding to the result on $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ we have:

Theorem 1.6. The complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers is a complete $\Sigma_{1}^{L_{\tau_{0}}}$ truth set.
(Recall that the complete $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ set is also the $\Sigma_{1}^{L_{\omega_{1}^{c k}}}$ truth set.) Moreover

Theorem 1.7. Any $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-game for which the player I has a winning strategy, has an eJ-recursive winning strategy.

Corresponding to the result on hyperarithmetic strategies we have:

Corollary 1.8. Any $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-game for which player I has a winning strategy, has a winning strategy in $L_{\tau_{0}}$.

We assume the reader has familiarity both with the constructible hierarchy of G del - for which see Devlin [4]. For the basic notions of descriptive set theory including the elementary theory of Gale-Stewart games, see Moschovakis [15]. Our notation is standard. Some of the results here relate to sub-systems of second order number, or analysis, and the basic theory of this is exposited in Simpson's monograph [16]. For models of admissible set theory, also called "Kripke-Platek set theory" or "KP" see Barwise [1]. By "KPI" we mean the theory KP augmented by the axiom that every set is an element of some admissible set.

In the language of generalized recursion theory, the pointclass $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ of sets of integers cannot be the 1-envelope of a normal type-2 function, by results of Harrington, Kechris, and Simpson (see [7]). (A "1-envelope" is the set of relations on $\omega$ recursive in the type- 2 functional.) What we are showing here is that the complete set of integers in $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ is however (recursively isomorphic to) the complete set which is ittm-semi-recursive in eJ - the eventual jump type-2 functional. It is the "ittm-1-envelope" of eJ. Section 3 contains some facts related to ittm-computations, and an exposition, and sets the scene with some basic results of our ittm-recursions-in-eJ.

We answer a further question of Lubarsky concerning Freezing-ITTM's at Corollary 4.9.

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## 2

We first repeat the extraction from our earlier paper [21] of a criterion for the constructible rank of $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ games' strategies. (Note that we take our games as defined in $L$ and using constructible, indeed an initial recursive, game trees; the existence of a winning strategy for a particular $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ (indeed arithmetic or Borel) game is a $\Sigma_{2}^{1}$ assertion about the countable tree $T$ and the payoff set. As $T \in L$ the truth of such an assertion has the same truth value in the universe of sets or in $L$. We thus expect to find such strategies in $L$ (since Davis in [3] proved such strategies exist in the universe $V$ of sets). But where are they?

Definition 2.1. A pair of ordinals $(\mu, \nu)$ is a $\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair, if $L_{\mu} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\nu}$ and moreover $\nu$ is the least such with this property. We say $\mu$ is $\Sigma_{2}$-extendible if there exists $\nu$ with $(\mu, \nu) a \Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair. By relativisation, a pair of ordinals $(\mu, \nu)$ is an $x-\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair, and $\mu$ is $x$ - $\Sigma_{2}$-extendible, if $L_{\mu}[x] \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\nu}[x]$.

Indeed all the above ideas relativise normally to real parameters $x \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$, and we thus have $\lambda(x)$, $\zeta(x), \Sigma(x)$ etc., with the latter two forming the least $x-\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair.

Definition 2.2. Let an $m$-depth $\Sigma_{2}$-nesting of an ordinal $\alpha$ be a sequence $\left(\zeta_{n}, \sigma_{n}\right)_{n<m}$ with (i) For $0 \leq n<m: \zeta_{n-1} \leq \zeta_{n}<\alpha<\sigma_{n}<\sigma_{n-1}$; (ii) $L_{\zeta_{n}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\sigma_{n}}$. We write $d(\alpha) \geq m$. If $\alpha$ is not nested we set $d(\alpha)=0$.

We shall want to consider non-standard admissible models $(M, E)$ of KP together with some other properties. We let $\operatorname{WFP}(M)$ be the wellfounded part of the model. By the so-called 'Truncation Lemma' it is well known ( $v .[1]$ ) that this well founded part must also be an admissible set. Usually for us the model will also be a countable one of " $V=L$ ". Let $M$ be such and let $\alpha=$ On $\cap \operatorname{WFP}(M)$. By the above $\alpha$ is thus an 'admissible ordinal', i.e. $L_{\alpha}$ will also be a KP model. An ' $\omega$-depth' nesting cannot exist by the wellfoundedness of the ordinals. However an ill founded model $M$ when viewed from the outside may have infinite descending chains of ' $M$-ordinals' in its ill founded part. These considerations motivate the following definition.

Definition 2.3. An infinite depth $\Sigma_{2}$-nesting of $\alpha$ based on $M$ is a sequence $\left(\zeta_{n}, s_{n}\right)_{n<\omega}$ with :
(i) $\zeta_{n-1} \leq \zeta_{n}<\alpha \subset s_{n} \subset s_{n-1}$; (ii) $s_{n} \in \mathrm{On}^{M}$; (iii) $\left(L_{\zeta_{n}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{s_{n}}\right)^{M}$.

Thus the $s_{n}$ form an infinite descending $E$-chain through the illfounded part of the model $M$. In [20] we devised a game whereby one player produced an $\omega$-model of a theory and the other player tried to find such infinite descending chains through $M$ 's ordinals. In this paper we shall switch the roles of the players, and have Player II produce the model and Player $I$ attempt to find the chain. (This is just to orientate the game as then $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$.)

In order for there to exist a non-standard model with an infinite depth nesting (of the ordinal of its wellfounded part) then the wellfounded part will already be a relatively long countable initial segment of $L$ (it is easy to see that if $\zeta=\sup _{n} \zeta_{n}$ then already $L_{\zeta} \vDash \Sigma_{1}$-Separation).

Example 2.4. (i) Let $\delta$ be least so that $L_{\delta} \vDash \Sigma_{2}$-Separation, and let $(M, E)$ be an admissible nonwellfounded end extension of $L_{\delta}$ with $L_{\delta}$ as its wellfounded part. Then there is an infinite depth nesting of $\delta$ based on $M$.
(ii) By refining considerations of the last example, let $\gamma_{0}$ be least such that there is $\gamma_{1}>\gamma_{0}$ with $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\gamma_{1}} \vDash$ KP. Then again there is an infinite depth nesting of $\gamma_{1}$ based on some illfounded end extension $M$ of $L_{\gamma_{1}}$.

Both of the above can be established by standard Barwise Compactness arguments. However both these $\delta$ and $\gamma_{0}$ we shall see are greater than the ordinal $\beta_{0}$ defined from this notion of nesting as follows.

Definition 2.5. Let $\beta_{0}$ be the least ordinal $\beta$ so that $L_{\beta}$ has an admissible end-extension $(M, E)$ based on which there exists an infinite depth $\Sigma_{2}$-nesting of $\beta$.

Definition 2.6. Let $\gamma_{0}$ be the least ordinal so that for any game $G(A, T)$ with $A \in \Sigma_{3}^{0}, T \in L_{\gamma_{0}} a$ game tree, then there is a winning strategy for a player definable over $L_{\gamma_{0}}$.

The following then pins down the location of winning strategies for games at this level played in, e.g. recursive trees.

Theorem 2.7. $\gamma_{0}=\beta_{0}$. Moreover, any $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-game for a tree $T$, with a strategy for Player $I$, has such a strategy an element of $L_{\beta_{0}}$. Any $\Pi_{3}^{0}$-game for such a tree has a strategy which is definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$.

Definition 2.8. Let $\eta_{0}$ be the closure ordinal of monotone $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-operators.

This ordinal will be less than $\beta_{0}$.

Theorem 2.9. (a) The following sets are recursively isomorphic.
(i) The complete ittm-semi-recursive-in-eJ set, $H^{\mathrm{eJ}}$;
(ii) the $\Sigma_{1}$-theory of $\left(L_{\eta_{0}}, \in\right)$;
(iii) the complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers.
(b) The ittm-recursive-in-eJ sets of integers are precisely those of $L_{\eta_{0}}$.

Definition 2.10. Let $\tau_{0}$ be the supremum of convergence ordinals of well-founded computations, arising from infinite time Turing machine computations on integers which are ittm-recursive (in a generalized sense of Kleene et al.) in the Type-2 eventual jump functional eJ.

Theorem 2.11. $\eta_{0}=\tau_{0}$.
Remark: (i) The proof reveals more about the $L$-least strategies for $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-games: those for player $I$, in fact can be found within a strictly bounded initial segment of $\beta_{0}$ : they will occur in $L_{\eta_{0}}$.
(ii) The existence of all the above ordinals, and $\beta$-models of the above theories can be proven in the subsystem of analysis $\Pi_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$, but not in $\Delta_{3}^{1}-\mathrm{CA}_{0}$ (or even some strengthenings of the latter) See [20].

### 2.1 The location of strategies for $\Sigma^{0}$-games

Proof: of Theorem 2.7 We look at the construction of the proof of Theorem 5 of [20] in particular that of Lemma 3. There we used an assumption that there is a triple of ordinals $\gamma_{0}<\gamma_{1}<\gamma_{2}$ with (a) $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\gamma_{1}}$ and (b) $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\gamma_{2}}$ and (c) $\gamma_{2}$ was the second admissible ordinal beyond $\gamma_{1}$. One assumed that $I$ did not have a winning strategy in $G(A ; T)$. The Lemma 3 there ran as follows:

Lemma 2.12. Let $B \subseteq A \subseteq\lceil T\rceil$ with $B \in \Pi_{0}^{0}$. If $(G(A ; T) \text { is not a win for } I)_{L_{\gamma_{0}}}$, then there is a quasi-strategy $T^{*} \in L_{\gamma_{0}}$ for II with the following properties:
(i) $\left\lceil T^{*}\right\rceil \cap B=\varnothing$
(ii) $\left(G\left(A ; T^{*}\right) \text { is not a win for } I\right)_{L_{\gamma_{0}}}$.

The format of the lemma's proof involved showing that the $\Sigma_{2}^{L_{\gamma_{0}}}$ notion of 'goodness' embodied in (i) and (ii) held for $\varnothing$. To do this involved defining goodness in general. We first define $T^{\prime}$ as $I I$ 's non-losing quasi-strategy for $G(A ; T)$ (the set of positions $p \in T$ so that $I$ does not have a winning strategy in $G\left(A ; T_{p}\right)$ ); this is $\Pi_{1}$ definable over $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ as the latter is a model KPI; in particular if we use the notation

Definition 2.13. $S_{\gamma}^{1}=_{\mathrm{df}}\left\{\delta<\gamma \mid L_{\delta} \prec_{\Sigma_{1}} L_{\gamma}\right\}$.
Definition 2.14. For $n \leq \omega$, let $T_{\delta}^{n}$ denote the $\Sigma_{n}$-theory of $L_{\delta}$.
then " $p \in T^{\prime}$ " is $\Pi_{1}^{L_{\zeta_{0}}}$, where $\zeta_{0}={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \min S_{\gamma_{0}}^{1} \backslash \rho_{L}(T)$. More generally we define:
A $p \in T^{\prime}$ is good if there is a quasi-strategy $T^{*}$ for $I I$ in $T_{p}^{\prime}$ so that the following hold:
(i) $\left\lceil T^{*}\right\rceil \cap B=\varnothing$;
(ii) $G\left(A ; T^{*}\right)$ is not a win for $I$.

Here $T_{p}^{\prime}$ is the subtree of $T^{\prime}$ below the node $p$. The point of requiring that the pair $\left(\gamma_{0}, \gamma_{1}\right)$ have the $\Sigma_{2}$-reflecting property of (a) above, is that the class $H$ of good $p$ 's of $L_{\gamma_{1}}$ is the same as that of $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ and so is a set in $L_{\gamma_{1}}$ as it is thus definable over $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ by a $\Sigma_{2}\left(\left\{T^{\prime}\right\}\right)$ definition. The overall argument is a proof by contradiction, where we assume that $\varnothing$ is in fact not good, and proceeds to construct a strategy $\sigma$ for Player $I$ in the game $G\left(A ; T^{\prime}\right)$, which is definable over $L_{\gamma_{1}}$, and is apparently winning in $L_{\gamma_{2}}$. (The requirement (c) that $\gamma_{2}$ be a couple of admissibles beyond $\gamma_{1}$ was only to allow for the strategy $\sigma$ to be seen to be truly winning by going to the next admissible set, and verifying that there are no winning runs of play for II.) The contradiction arises since $T^{\prime}$ - which was defined as the subtree of $T$ of $I I$ 's non-losing positions - is concluded still to be the same subtree of non-losing positions in $L_{\gamma_{2}}$. Being a non-losing position, $p$ say, for $I I$ is a $\Pi_{1}$ property of $p$. This carries up from $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ to $L_{\gamma_{2}}$ as $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec_{\Sigma_{1}} L_{\gamma_{2}}$, and this is the reason for the requirement (b): we want $T^{\prime}$ to survive beyond $L_{\gamma_{1}}$ for our argument to work. (This idea is important for the arguments in Section 4, so let us refer to it as 'the survival argument'.) There is then no winning strategy for $I$ in $G\left(A ; T^{\prime}\right)$ definable over $L_{\gamma_{1}}$, contradicting the reasoning that $\sigma$ is such.

This proves the Lemma: $L_{\gamma_{1}}$ sees there is $T^{*}$ a subtree of $T^{\prime}$ witnessing that $\varnothing$ is good. The existence of such a subtree is a $\Sigma_{2}\left(\left\{T^{\prime}\right\}\right)$-sentence, and then again this reflects down to $L_{\gamma_{0}}$. We thus have such a $T^{*}$ in $L_{\gamma_{0}}$.

The Theorem is proven by repeated applications of the Lemma, by using the argument for each $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ set $B_{n}$ in turn where $A=\bigcup_{n} B_{n}$ and refining the trees using this procession from a tree to a subtree $T^{*}$. We thus repeat the argument with $T^{*}$ replacing $T$. Because $T^{*} \in L_{\gamma_{0}}$ we have the same constellation of this triple of ordinals $\gamma_{i}$ above the constructible rank of $T^{*}$, and can do this.

However we can get away with less. The definition of the subtree of non-losing positions of II now this time in the new $T^{*}$ can be considered as taking place $\Pi_{1}$ over $L_{\delta_{0}}$ where $\delta_{0}$ is the least element of $S_{\gamma_{0}}^{1}$ with $T^{*} \in L_{\delta_{0}}$. To get our contradiction we actually use that $L_{\delta_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\gamma_{2}}$; we do not need that $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\gamma_{2}}$. Notice that our argument that $T^{*}$ exists is non-constructive: we simply say that the $\Sigma_{2}$-sentence of its existence reflects to $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ : we do not have any control over its constructible rank below $\gamma_{0}$. Moreover any sufficiently large $\gamma^{\prime}$ greater than $\gamma_{1}$ would do for the upper ordinal, as long as it is a couple of admissibles larger than $\gamma_{1}$. Thus we could apply the Lemma repeatedly for different $B_{n}$ if we have a guarantee that whenever a $T_{n}^{*}$-like subtree is defined there exists a $\zeta_{n} \in S_{\gamma_{0}}^{1}$ and a suitable upper ordinal $\gamma_{n}>\gamma_{1}$ with $T_{n}^{*} \in L_{\zeta_{n}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\gamma_{n}}$. Of course if there are arbitrarily large $\zeta_{n}$ below $\gamma_{0}$ with this extendability property, then this is tantamount to $L_{\gamma_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\gamma^{\prime}}$ for some suitable $\gamma^{\prime}$, and this shows why our original constellation of $\gamma_{i}$ provides a sufficient condition.

Actually as the final paragraph of the Theorem 5 there shows, we are doing slightly more than this: we are, each time, applying the Lemma infinitely often to each possible subtree of $T^{*}$ below some node $p_{2}$ of it which is of length 2 , to define our strategy $\tau$ applied to moves of length 3 . We then move on to the next $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ set. Although we are applying the Lemma infinitely many times for each such $p_{2}$, and thus infinitely many new $\Sigma_{2}$-sentences, or trees, have to be instantiated, we had that $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ is a $\Sigma_{2}$-admissible set, and as the class of such $p_{2}$ is just a set of $L_{\gamma_{0}}, \Sigma_{2}$-admissibility works for us to find a bound for the ranks of the witnessing trees, as some $\delta<\gamma_{0}$. We thus can claim that our final $\tau$ is an element of $L_{\gamma_{0}}$ even after $\omega$-many iterations of this process.
$\left(\beta_{0} \geq \gamma_{0}\right)$ We argue for this. Let $(M, E)$ be a non-standard model of KP with an infinite nesting $\left(\zeta_{n}, s_{n}\right)$ about $\beta_{0}$ as described. Note that $S_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$ must be unbounded in $\beta_{0}$ (so that $L_{\beta_{0}} \vDash \Sigma_{1}$-Separation), and each $\zeta_{n}$ is a limit point of $S_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$. We do not assume that $\beta_{0}$ is $\Sigma_{2}$-admissible (which in fact it is not as the proof shows). Let $T \in L_{\beta_{0}}$ be a game tree. By omitting finitely much of the outer nesting we assume $T \in L_{\zeta_{0}}$. We assume that Player $I$ has no winning strategy for $G(A ; T)$ in $L_{\beta_{0}}$ (for otherwise we are done). Note that in $M$ we have that $L_{s_{0}}$ also has no winning strategy for this game (otherwise the existence of such would reflect into $L_{\beta_{0}}$. We show that $I I$ has a winning strategy definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$. Let $A=\bigcup B_{n}$ with each $B_{n} \in \Pi_{2}^{0}$. For $n=0$ we apply the argument of the Lemma using the pair $\left(\zeta_{1}, s_{1}\right)$ in the role of $\left(\gamma_{0}, \gamma_{1}\right)$ from before, with $\left(\zeta_{0}, s_{0}\right)$ in the role of $\left(\delta_{0}, \gamma_{2}\right)$ described above, i.e. we use only that $T \in L_{\zeta_{0}}$ and that $L_{\zeta_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{s_{0}}$.

The Lemma then asserts the existence of a quasi-strategy for II definable using the pair $\left(\zeta_{1}, s_{1}\right)$ : $T^{*}(\varnothing)$. By $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection the $L$-least such lies in $L_{\zeta_{1}}$, and we shall assume that $T^{*}(\varnothing)$ refers to it.

Claim: For any pair $\left(\zeta_{n}, s_{n}\right)$ for $n \geq 1$ the same tree $T^{*}(\varnothing)$ would have resulted using this pair.
Proof: Note that we can define such a tree like $T^{*}(\varnothing)$ using such pairs, since for all of them we have that $\left(\zeta_{0}, s_{0}\right) \supset\left(\zeta_{1}, s_{1}\right) \supset\left(\zeta_{m}, s_{m}\right)$ for $m>1$. As $T^{*}(\varnothing) \in L_{\zeta_{1}}$ and satisfies a $\Sigma_{2}$ defining condition there, and since we also have $\zeta_{1} \in S_{\zeta_{m}}^{1}$, it thus satisfies the same $\Sigma_{2}$ condition in $L_{\zeta_{m}}$.
Q.E.D. Claim

For any position $p_{1} \in T$ with $\operatorname{lh}\left(p_{1}\right)=1$, let $\tau\left(p_{1}\right)$ be some arbitrary but fixed move in $T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$, this now II's non-losing quasi-strategy for the game $G\left(A, T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)$ as defined in $L_{\zeta_{2}}$. The relation " $p \in$ $T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$ " is $\Pi_{1}^{L_{\zeta_{2}}}\left(\left\{T^{*}(\varnothing)\right\}\right)$ or equivalently $\Pi_{1}^{L_{\zeta_{1}}}\left(\left\{T^{*}(\varnothing)\right\}\right)$, or indeed $\Pi_{1}^{L_{\delta}}\left(\left\{T^{*}(\varnothing)\right\}\right)$ where $\delta$ is least in $S_{\zeta_{1}}^{1}$ above $\rho_{L}\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)$. Hence " $y=T^{\prime}(\varnothing) " \in \Delta_{2}^{L \delta}\left(\left\{T^{*}(\varnothing)\right\}\right)$ and thus $T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$ also lies in $L_{\zeta_{1}}$. For definiteness we let $\tau\left(p_{1}\right)$ be the numerically least move.

For any play, $p_{2}$ say, of length 2 consistent with the above definition of $\tau$ so far, we apply the lemma again with $B=A_{1}$ replacing $B=A_{0}$ and with $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}$ replacing $T$. We use the nested pair $\left(\zeta_{2}, s_{2}\right)$ to define quasi-strategies for $I I$, call them $T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)$, one for each of the countably many $p_{2}$. These are each definable in a $\Sigma_{2}$ way over $L_{\zeta_{2}}$, in the parameter $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}$. This argument uses that $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}} \in L_{\zeta_{1}} \prec_{\Sigma_{1}} L_{s_{1}}$. Let $T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right) \in L_{\zeta_{2}}$ be II's non-losing quasi-strategy for $G\left(A, T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right)$, this time with " $y=T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$ " $\in \Delta_{2}^{L_{\zeta_{2}}}\left(\left\{T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right\}\right)$. (Again these will satisfy the same definitions as over $L_{\zeta_{m}}$ for any $m \geq 2$.) Note that we may assume that the countably many trees $T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$ appear boundedly below $\zeta_{2}$ (using the $\Sigma_{2}$-admissibility of $\zeta_{2}$ ). Again for $p_{3} \in T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)$ any position of length 3, let $\tau\left(p_{3}\right)$ be some arbitrary but fixed move in $T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$. Now we consider appropriate moves $p_{4}$ of length 4, and reapply the lemma with $B=A_{2}$ and $\left(T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right)_{p_{4}}$. Continuing in this way we obtain a strategy $\tau$ for II, so that $\tau \upharpoonright^{[1,2 k+2)} \omega$, for $k<\omega$, is defined by a length $k$-recursion that is $\Sigma_{2}^{L_{\zeta_{k}}}(\{T\})$.

As the argument continues more and more of the strategy $\tau$ is defined using successive $\left(\zeta_{m}, s_{m}\right)$ to justify the existence of the relevant trees in $L_{\zeta_{m}}$. Knowing that the trees are there for the asking, we see that $\tau$ can actually be defined by a $\Sigma_{2}$-recursion over $L_{\beta_{0}}$ in the parameter $T$ in precisely the manner given above (the $\Sigma_{2}$-inadmissibility of $\beta_{0}$ notwithstanding).

If $x$ is any play consistent with $\tau$, then for every $n$, by the defining properties of $T^{*}\left(p_{2 n}\right)$ given by the relevant application of the lemma, $x \in\left\lceil T^{*}(x \upharpoonright 2 n)\right\rceil \subseteq \neg A_{n}$. Hence $x \notin A$, and $\tau$ is a winning strategy for II as required. Thus $\beta_{0} \geq \gamma_{0}$ is demonstrated.
$\left(\beta_{0} \leq \gamma_{0}\right)$ : suppose $\beta_{0}>\gamma_{0}$. Then, since the existence of a winning strategy for a player in any particular $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ game would be part of the theory $T_{\beta_{0}}^{1}=T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ where $\alpha_{0}$ is least with $L_{\alpha_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\beta_{0}}$, and since moreover that the existence of a stage $\gamma_{0}$ over which all such games have strategies, amounts also to an existential statement, we have that $\gamma_{0}<\alpha_{0}$. But this is an immediate contradiction: find a $\psi \in T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ with $\gamma_{0}<\alpha_{\psi}<\alpha_{0}$. But as before II has as winning strategy $\sigma$ to play a code for $L_{\alpha_{\psi}}$. Hence as $\gamma_{0}<\alpha_{\psi}$ such a strategy and so such a code can be found in $L_{\alpha_{\psi}}$; but again as before, this contradicts Tarski. Contradiction. Hence $\beta_{0} \leq \gamma_{0}$.
Q.E.D. Theorem 2.7

Remark 2.15. We make some definitions from the $\left(\beta_{0} \geq \gamma_{0}\right)$ part of the last proof for later use. We have our starting tree $T$, and the tree of non-losing positions for $I I, T^{\prime}$. We shall call these the trees of depth 0 . Then for any $p \in T^{\prime}$ we argued that $p$ was good, and, since $\varnothing$ was good, we could define the tree $T^{*}(\varnothing)$ - the $L$-least tree witnessing this fact, and thence we had $T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$ the tree of non-losing positions for II in $G\left(A, T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)$. We give the trees $T^{*}(\varnothing), T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$ depth 1 . Then for any position $p_{1} \in T$ with $\operatorname{lh}\left(p_{1}\right)=1$, we let $\tau\left(p_{1}\right)$ be the numerically least move in $T^{\prime}(\varnothing)$. We call any play, $p_{2}$ say, of length 2 consistent with this definition of $\tau$ so far, relevant (of length 2 ). We wished to apply the lemma again with $B=A_{1}$ replacing $B=A_{0}$ and with $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}$ replacing $T$. We shall call a tree of the form $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}$ or $\left(\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$ (the latter the tree of non-losing moves for II in $\left.G\left(A ;\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)\right)$ relevant trees of depth 1 . We then used $\left(\zeta_{2}, s_{2}\right)$ to define the $T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)$ (one tree for each relevant $p_{2}$ ) and thence the trees $T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$ to be II's non-losing quasi-strategy for $G(A$, $\left.T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right)$. We give trees of the form $T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right), T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$ depth 2 . For $p_{3} \in T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)$ any position of length 3, $\tau\left(p_{3}\right)$ was the numerically least move in $T^{\prime}\left(p_{2}\right)$. Again we call such $p_{4}=p_{3} \sim \tau\left(p_{3}\right)$ relevant, and the corresponding trees $\left(T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right)_{p_{4}}$ and $\left.\left(T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)\right)_{p_{4}}\right)^{\prime}$ relevant trees of depth 2 . $T^{*}\left(p_{4}\right), T^{\prime}\left(p_{4}\right)$ will be of depth 3. And so forth.

Definition 2.16. Let $\mathbb{T}^{k}$ denote the set of trees, and relevant trees, of depth $k$, as just defined for $k<\omega$.
We return now to considering the complexity of $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$.
Theorem 2.17. Let $\alpha_{0}$ be least with $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}=T_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$ (thus $\alpha_{0}=\min S_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$ ).
(i) $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ is a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers.
(ii) Hence the reals of $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ are all $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ sets of integers.

Proof: The argument is really close to that of the Corollary 2 of [20]. Indeed there we showed that the $T_{\alpha_{\psi}}^{1}$ (which occurred cofinally in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ ) were $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ sets. Some details of this are repeated. First remark that (ii) is immediate given (i) since all the other reals in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ are all recursive in $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ and $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$, being a Spector class ( $v$. [15]), is closed under recursive substitution. We define a game $G_{\varphi}^{*}$ for $\Sigma_{1}$-sentences $\varphi$.

Rules for II.
In this game $I I$ 's moves in $x$ must be a set of G del numbers for the complete $\Sigma_{1}$-theory of an $\omega$ model of KP $+V=L+\left(\neg \varphi \wedge \operatorname{Det}\left(\Sigma_{3}^{0}\right)\right)$.

Everything else remains the same mutatis mutandis: I's Rules remain the same and his task is to find an infinite descending chain through the ordinals of II's model. Note that if $\varphi \in T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$, I now has a winning strategy: for if $I I$ obeys her rules, and lists an $x$ which codes an $\omega$-model $M$ of this theory, then $M$ is not wellfounded, and has $\operatorname{WFP}(M) \cap \operatorname{On}<\rho(\varphi)$ where $\rho(\varphi)$ is defined as the least $\rho$ such that $\varphi \in T_{\rho+1}^{1}$. However I playing (just as II did in the main Theorem 4) can find a descending chain and win. For we have $\operatorname{WFP}(M) \cap \mathrm{On}<\beta_{0}$ and so the argument goes through, as there are no infinite depth nestings there. On the other hand if $\varphi \notin T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$, II may just play a code for the true wellfounded $L_{\beta_{0}^{+}}$with $\beta_{0}^{+}$the least admissible above $\beta_{0}+1$, and so win. This shows that $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ is a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers.

Now suppose $a \in \partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$. Then we have some $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set $A \subseteq \omega \times{ }^{\omega} \omega$ with $n \in a \longleftrightarrow I$ has a winning strategy to play into $A_{a}=\left\{y \in{ }^{\omega} \omega \mid(a, y) \in A\right\}$. Then $a$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{L_{\alpha_{0}}}$ (since all $\Sigma_{3^{0}}^{0}$-games that are a win for $I$, have a winning strategy an element of $L_{\beta_{0}}$, and thence by $\Sigma_{1}$-elementarity, the $L$-least such is actually an element of $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ - and we merely have to search through $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ for it) and thus is recursive in $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$. Hence $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ is a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers. Q.E.D. Theorem 2.17 and 2.9 (a) (ii) $\leftrightarrow$ (iii).

In conclusion: we saw above that $\alpha_{0}$ was the least $\alpha$ with $T_{\alpha}^{1}=T_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$. Phrased in other terms, by elementary constructible hierarchy considerations, this is saying that $\alpha_{0}$ is the minimum of $S_{\beta_{0}}^{1}$. Hence $L_{\alpha_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\beta_{0}}$ but for no smaller $\delta$ is $L_{\delta} \prec_{\Sigma_{1}} L_{\beta_{0}}$. Since the statement "There is a winning strategy for Player $I$ in $G(A, T)$ " is equivalent in KPI to a $\Sigma_{1}$-assertion, if true in $L_{\beta_{0}}$ it is true in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. In short for those $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$-games that are wins for $I$ on trees $T \in L_{\alpha_{0}}$, there are strategies for such also within $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ itself. For those that are wins for Player $I I$, when not found in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$, these may be defined over $L_{\beta_{0}}$. This somewhat asymmetrical picture reflects the earlier theorems cited above. The theorems of the next section harmonise perfectly with this.

Remark: (i) Since $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ is a Spector class, one will have a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-prewellordering of $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ as a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set of integers, of maximal length, here $\alpha_{0}$.

We write down one on $T=T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$. Abbreviate $\Gamma=\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ and $\check{\Gamma}=\partial \Pi_{3}^{0}$. We need to provide relations $\leq_{\Gamma}$ and $\leq_{\check{\Gamma}}$ in $\Gamma$ and $\check{\Gamma}$ respectively, so that the following hold:

$$
T(y) \Longrightarrow \forall x\left\{[T(x) \wedge \rho(x) \leq \rho(y)] \Longleftrightarrow x \leq_{\Gamma} y \Longleftrightarrow x \leq_{\check{\Gamma}} y\right\}
$$

For the relation $x \leq_{\Gamma} y$, we define the game where II produces a model $M^{I I}$ of $T(y) \wedge(\neg$ $T(x) \vee \rho(x) \nsubseteq \rho(y))$ and $I$ tries to demonstrate that it is illfounded. Assume then $T(y)$. If $T(x) \wedge$ $\rho(x) \leq \rho(y)$ then either $(\neg T(x))^{M^{I I}}$ and thus $M^{I I}$ is illfounded with $\operatorname{WFP}\left(M^{I I}\right) \cap \operatorname{On}<\rho(x)$ and hence $I$ can win as in this region there are no $\omega$-nested sequences. $\operatorname{Or}:(\rho(x) \not \leq \rho(y))^{M^{I I}}$. Thus $(\rho(x)>\rho(y))^{M^{I I}}$ and again this implies $\operatorname{WFP}\left(M^{I I}\right) \cap \mathrm{On}<\rho(x)$ with $I$ winning.

Conversely suppose $x \leq_{\Gamma} y$. Since $T(y)$ is assumed, if $\neg T(x)$, then II can play a wellfounded model with $(y \wedge \neg x)^{M^{I I}}$ and win. If $\rho(x)>\rho(y)$ then again the same can be done. This proves the first equivalence above. The second is similar, with now $I$ producing a model $M^{I}$ of $T(x) \wedge$ $\rho(x) \leq \rho(y)$ and II finding descending chains. We leave the details to the reader.
(ii) One may also write out directly the theories $T_{\alpha}^{1}$ for $\alpha<\alpha_{0}$ in a $\partial \Pi_{3}^{0}$ form. This should not be surprising: a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ norm as above should have 'good' $\Delta\left(\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}\right)$ initial segments.
(iii) For any set $A \in \partial \Pi_{3}^{0} \backslash \partial \Sigma_{3}$ there will be $n \in A$ so that the winning strategy witnessing this is definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$ but not an element thereof. (Otherwise an admissibility and $\Sigma_{1}$-reflection argument shows that there is a level $L_{\delta}$ with $\delta<\alpha_{0}$ containing strategies for both $A$ and its complement. But that would make $A \in \Delta\left(\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}\right)$ - a contradiction.)

Corollary 2.18. $\eta_{0}=\alpha_{0}$.
Proof: Since $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ is a Spector class, and we see that a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set has a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-norm of length $\alpha_{0}$, standard reasoning shows that there is a $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-monotone operator whose closure ordinal is $\alpha_{0}$. Hence $\eta_{0}=\alpha_{0}$.
Q.E.D.

Results of Martin in [13] show that for a co-Spector class, $\check{\Gamma}$ say, the closure ordinal of monotone $\check{\Gamma}$-operators, $o(\check{\Gamma}$-mon $)={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \sup \{o(\Phi) \mid \Phi \in \check{\Gamma}, \Phi$ monotone $\}$, is non-projectible, that is $L_{o(\check{\Gamma} \text {-mon })} \vDash \Sigma_{1}$-Sep. Moreover $o(\Gamma)<o(\check{\Gamma}$-mon $)$.

He shows:
Theorem 2.19. (Theorem $D[13])$ Let $\Gamma$ be a Spector pointclass. (i) Suppose that for every $X \subseteq \omega$, and every $\check{\Gamma}(X)$ monotone $\Phi$, that $\Phi^{\infty} \in \check{\Gamma}(X)$, then o( $\check{\Gamma}$-mon) is non-projectible, that is $S_{o(\check{\Gamma}-m o n)}^{1}$ is unbounded in $o(\check{\Gamma}-\mathrm{mon})$.
(ii) (from the proof of his Lemma D.1) $\quad o(\Gamma$-mon $) \in S_{o(\check{\Gamma} \text {-mon })}^{1}$.
(He shows too that for Spector classes such as $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$, the supposition of (i) is fulfilled.) If we set $\pi_{0}$ to be the closure ordinal of $\partial \Pi_{3}^{0}$-mon. operators, then in this context we have an upper bound for $\pi_{0}$ :

Lemma 2.20. $\alpha_{0}<\pi_{0} \leq \beta_{0}$.
Proof: By (ii) of the last theorem, $\alpha_{0} \in S_{\pi_{0}}^{1}$. But for no $\beta^{\prime}>\beta_{0}$ do we have $L_{\alpha_{0}} \prec_{\Sigma_{1}} L_{\beta^{\prime}}$ (as there are games with winning strategies (for II) in $L_{\beta_{0}+1}$ for which there are none in $L_{\beta_{0}}$ ).
Q.E.D.

Question: Is $\pi_{0}=\beta_{0}$ ?

## 3 Recursion in eJ

### 3.1 Kleene Recursion in higher types

We take some notation and discussion from Hinman [8]. There was developed the basic theory of higher type recursion based on an equational calculus defined by Kleene and refined by him and Gandy in the 1960's. The basic intuition was to define recursions using not just recursive functions on integers but also allowing recursive schemes using 'computable' functions $f: \omega \times{ }^{\omega} \omega \longrightarrow \omega$ (and similarly for domains which are product spaces of this type). A basic result in this area is that the functions recursive in $E$ (defined below) are precisely those recursive in $J$, the 'ordinary Turing jump', where we set

$$
\begin{aligned}
J(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) & =0 \text { if }\{e\}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) \downarrow \\
& =1 \quad \text { otherwise } .
\end{aligned}
$$

(We shall follow mostly Hinman in using boldface notation, early or mid-alphabet roman for integers, but end alphabet roman for elements of ${ }^{\omega} \omega$, to indicate an (unspecified) number of variables of the given type in an appropriate product space ${ }^{k} \omega \times{ }^{l}\left({ }^{\omega} \omega\right)$ - which he abbreviates as ${ }^{k, l} \omega$.) Then $E$ (often written ${ }^{2} E$ ) is the functional:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E(x) \quad & =0 \quad \text { if } \exists n(x(n)=0) \\
& =1 \quad \text { otherwise } .
\end{aligned}
$$

For a fixed type-2 functional $I$ of the kind above - thus a function $I:{ }^{k} \omega \times{ }^{l}\left({ }^{\omega} \omega\right) \longrightarrow \omega$ such as $E$ or $J$ just defined, an inductive definition of a set, $\Omega(I)$, consisting of equational clauses can be built up in $\omega_{1}$-steps. This defines the class of those functions $\{e\}^{I}$ that are recursive in $I$. Of course such include partial functions, as a descending chain of subcomputation calls in the tree of computations represents divergence. Just as the clauses of the induction and the set $\Omega(I)$ is an expansion of those clauses and functions of type-1 recursion, also due to Kleene and yielding an inductive set $\Omega$, we shall wish to expand the notion of 'computation' further along another axis.

Our notation for computation will be modelled on that of the transfinite machine model, the 'infinite time Turing machine' introduced by Hamkins and Kidder [5]. The signifying feature of such ITTM's is the transfinite number of stages that they are allowed to run their standard finite Turing program, on their one-way infinite tape. The behaviour at limit stages is defined by a 'liminf' rule for the cell values of 0 or 1 , and a replacing of the read/write head back at the start of the tape, and finally a special 'limit state' $q_{L}$ is entered into.

Actually the formalism is quite robust: one may change details of these arrangements without altering the computational power. In [5] they considered a 3-tape arrangement (for Input, Scratch Work, and Output). The paper [6] shows this can be reduced to 1-tape (if the alphabet has more than two symbols!). One can change the limit behaviour so that instead of a liminf value being declared for each cell's value, it simply becomes blank - for ambiguity - if it has changed value cofinally in the limit stage (Theorem 1 of [18]). Similarly the special state $q_{L}$ is unnecessary: one may define the "next instruction" at a limit stage to be the instruction, or transition table entry, whose number is the liminf of the previous instruction numbers - this has the machine entering the outermost subroutine that was called cofinally in the stage. Likewise the Read/Write head may be placed at the cell numbered according to the liminf values of the cells visited prior to that limit stage (unless that liminf is now infinite, in which case we do return the head to the starting cell). All of these variants make no difference to the functions computed.

We shall review the following facts related to such machines.

### 3.2 Infinite Time Turing Machine computation

Such ITTM's have two modes of producing results: a program can halt outright with an infinite string of 0,1 's on the part of the tape designated for output (the 'output tape') but it may also have some 'eventual output': the contents of the output tape may have settled down to a fixed value, whilst the machine is still churning away perhaps moving its head around and fiddling with the scratch portion of the tape. Nevertheless on a given fixed input (some $x \in^{\omega} 2$ may be written to a designated portion of the tape, the 'input tape') any ITTM machine will eventually start to cycle - and by the starting point of that cycling, designated $\zeta(x)$, if the output settles down, then it will have done so by $\zeta(x)$.

This last feature is in fact, quite fundamental for the study of ITTMs. We may regard a machine $P_{e}(x)$ in this context, as having come to a conclusion - the contents of the output tape - but has not formally reached a halting state in the usual sense.

Definition 3.1. We shall say that a computation $P_{e}(x)$ is convergent to $y$ (and write $\left.P_{e}(x) \mid y\right)$ if it enters a halting state in the usual sense, or if it has eventually settled output. We shall say that " $y$ is (eventually)-ittm-recursive in $x$ ". If it does not have settled output, we shall write $P_{e}(x) \uparrow$.

This enshrines our taking (eventually) settled output, as the criterion of a successful computation. We shall be interested in eventual output of this sort, as well as the more restricted strictly halting variety. Both types of computation, the usual halting, and the 'eventually constant' output tape outlined above, we shall regard, and term, as 'convergent' - thinking of 'halting' as only a special kind of eventually settled output. Given a set $A \subseteq \omega \cup^{\omega} 2$, this can be used as an oracle for an ITTM in a familiar way: ?Is the integer on (or is the whole of) the current output tape contents an element of $A$ ? and receive a $1 / 0$ answer for "Yes"/"No". We identify elements of $\omega$ as coded up in ${ }^{\omega} 2$ in some fixed way, and so may consider such $A$ as subsets of ${ }^{\omega} 2$. But further: since having $A$ respond with one $0 / 1$ at a time can be repeated, we could equally as well allow $A$ to return an element $f \in{ }^{\omega} 2$ as a response (we have no shortage of time). We could then also allow as functionals also $A$ : ${ }^{\omega} 2 \longrightarrow{ }^{\omega} 2$. However for the moment we shall only consider functionals into $\omega$. Some examples follow.

Definition 3.2. (The infinite time jump iJ)
$\mathrm{i} \mathrm{J}(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})=1$ if $\{e\}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) \downarrow$ (i.e. the $e^{\prime}$ th ittm-computable function with input $\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}$ has a halting value)

$$
=0 \quad \text { otherwise }
$$

Definition 3.3. (The eventual jump eJ)

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{eJ}(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})= 1 \text { if }\{e\}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) \mid \quad \text { (i.e. the } e^{\prime} \text { th ittm-computable function with } \\
& \text { input } \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x} \text { has an eventually settled value) } \\
&=0 \quad \text { otherwise (for which we write }\{e\}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) \uparrow) .
\end{aligned}
$$

These are both total functionals. We shall be interested in functions recursive in eJ. But first we summarise some facts about ordinary ittm's.

Fact 1 [5] shows:
(i) That $\Pi_{1}^{1}$-predicates are decidable: given a code $x \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$, there's an ittm that will decide whether $x \in \mathrm{WO}$ or not.
(ii) There's a program number $e$ so that $P_{e}(x)$ will halt with a code for $\left(L_{\alpha}, \in\right)$ if $x \in \mathrm{WO} \wedge$ $\|x\|=\alpha$.
(iii) For $z \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}$, the set of ittm-writable-in-z reals, is the set $\mathcal{W}^{z} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ where
$\mathcal{W}^{z}=\left\{x \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} \mid \exists e P_{e}(z)\right.$ halts with output $\left.x\right\}$.
(iv) The set of ittm-eventually-writable-in- $z$ reals, is the set
$\mathcal{E} \mathcal{W}^{z}=\left\{x \in 2^{\mathbb{N}} \mid \exists e\left(P_{e}(z)\right.\right.$ has $x$ written on its output tape from some point in time onwards) $\}$.

Fact 2 [19] shows:
(i) Let $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ be the lexicographically least pair of ordinals so that $L_{\zeta} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\Sigma}$. Let $\lambda$ be the least ordinal with $L_{\lambda} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\zeta}$. Then (The " $\lambda$ - $\zeta$ - $\Sigma$-Theorem"), $L_{\lambda} \cap 2^{\mathbb{N}}=\mathcal{W}, L_{\zeta} \cap 2^{\mathbb{N}}=\mathcal{E} \mathcal{W}$. As is easily seen all three ordinals are limits of $\Sigma_{2}$-admissibles, whilst $\lambda$ is $\Sigma_{1}$ - but not $\Sigma_{2}$-admissible, and $\Sigma$ is not admissible at all.
(ii) (a) Any computation $P_{e}(n)$ that halts (in the usual sense) does so by a time $\alpha<\lambda$.
(b) Any computation $P_{e}(n)$ that eventually has a settled output tape, does so by a time $\alpha<\zeta$.
(c) Both $\lambda$ and $\zeta$ are the suprema of such fully "halting" times, and "eventual convergence" times, over varying $e, n \in \omega$, respectively.
(iii) $T_{\lambda}^{1} \equiv{ }_{1} h$, and $T_{\zeta}^{2} \equiv_{1} \tilde{h}$ where $h=\left\{e \mid P_{e}(e)\right.$ reaches a halting state $\}$ and $\tilde{h}=\left\{e \mid P_{e}(e)\right.$ eventually has settled output $\}$.
(iv) It is a consequent of (iii) that a universal machine (on integer input) has snapshots of its behaviour which, when first entering a final loop at stage $\zeta$, will repeat with the same snapshot at time $\Sigma$; moreover (1-1) in those snapshots is the theory $T_{\zeta}^{2}$.
(v) Recursion, and Snm Theorems may be proved in the standard manner ([5]); there are appropriate versions of the Kleene Normal Form Theorems ([19]).

The usual argument shows:

Theorem 3.4. (The eJ-Recursion theorem) If $F(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is recursive in eJ , there is $e_{0} \in \omega$ so that

$$
\varphi_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})=F\left(e_{0}, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}\right) .
$$

### 3.2.1 More on Extendability

As Fact 2 (i) above shows, the relation of " $L_{\zeta}$ has a $\Sigma_{2}$-extension to $L_{\Sigma}$ " is fundamental to this notion.

Fact 2 (contd.)
(vi) There is moreover a theory machine that writes codes for $L_{\alpha}$ and their $\Sigma_{\omega}$-theories, and hence their $\Sigma_{2}$-theories, $T_{\alpha}^{2}$, in an ittm-computable fashion for any $\alpha<\Sigma$, uniformly in $\alpha$. If for $\operatorname{Lim}(\lambda)$ we write $\hat{T}_{\lambda}={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \operatorname{Liminf}_{\alpha \rightarrow \lambda} T_{\alpha}^{2}$, then there is a uniform index $e \in \omega$ that shows that $W_{e}^{\hat{T}_{\lambda}}=T_{\lambda}^{2}$, i.e. $T_{\lambda}^{2}$ is r.e. in $\hat{T}_{\lambda}$ uniformly in $\lambda$. (See Lemma 2.5 of [22]. Moreover for those $\lambda$ with $L_{\lambda} \vDash \Sigma_{1}$-Sep, $T_{\lambda}^{2}=\hat{T}_{\lambda}$.)
(vii) For the lexicographically least extendible pair $(\zeta, \Sigma)$, whilst $\omega_{1 \mathrm{ck}}^{T_{\zeta}^{2}}<\Sigma$, it is the case that $\lambda\left(T_{\zeta}^{2}\right)>\Sigma$.

We make some further definitions concerning extendability.

Definition 3.5. (The $\Sigma_{2}$-extendibility tree) We let $(\mathcal{T}, \prec)$ be the natural tree on such pairs under inclusion: as follows: if $\left(\zeta^{\prime}, \Sigma^{\prime}\right),(\bar{\zeta}, \bar{\Sigma})$ are any two countable $\Sigma_{2}$-extendable pairs, then set ( $\zeta^{\prime}$, $\left.\Sigma^{\prime}\right) \prec(\bar{\zeta}, \bar{\Sigma})$ iff $\zeta^{\prime} \leq \bar{\zeta}<\bar{\Sigma}<\Sigma^{\prime}$.

- If we had allowed the inequality $\bar{\Sigma} \leq \Sigma^{\prime}$ rather than a strict inequalitiy in the last definition we could have defined a larger relation $\prec^{\prime}$, and a larger tree $\left(\mathcal{T}^{\prime}, \prec^{\prime}\right)$; however this would not have been wellfounded: if $L_{\Sigma} \vDash \Sigma_{2}$-Sep then it is easy to see that $\left(\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \upharpoonright \Sigma+1, \prec^{\prime}\right)$ is illfounded.

Lemma 3.6. Let $\delta$ be least such that $L_{\delta} \vDash \Sigma_{2}$-Sep. ; let $\alpha$ be maximal so that ( $\left.\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \upharpoonright \alpha, \prec^{\prime}\right)$ is wellfounded (where $\operatorname{Field}\left(\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \upharpoonright \alpha\right)={ }_{\mathrm{df}}\{(\zeta, \Sigma)$ extendible $\mid \Sigma<\alpha\}$ ). Then $\delta=\alpha$.

Proof: $(\leq)$ : Suppose $\delta>\alpha$. Then $\left(\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \upharpoonright \delta, \prec\right)$ is illfounded. So there is an infinite sequence of extendible pairs $\left(\zeta_{n}, \Sigma_{n}\right)$ with $\left(\zeta_{n+1}, \Sigma_{n+1}\right) \subset\left(\zeta_{n}, \Sigma_{n}\right)$. By wellfoundedness of the ordinals there is an infinite subsequence $\left(\zeta_{n_{i}}, \Sigma_{n_{i}}\right.$ ) with all $\Sigma_{n_{i}}$ equal to a fixed $\Sigma$, whilst $\zeta_{n_{i}}<\zeta_{n_{i+1}}$. Let $\zeta^{*}=\sup _{i} \zeta_{n_{i}}$. Then we have $L_{\zeta_{n_{i}}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\zeta_{n_{i+1}}} \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\zeta^{*}}$. Then $\zeta^{*}$ is not $\Sigma_{2}$-projectible, and hence $L_{\zeta^{*}} \vDash \Sigma_{2}$-Sep. But $\zeta^{*}<\delta$. Contradiction.
$(\geq): L_{\delta} \vDash \Sigma_{2}$-Sep. Then $S_{\delta}^{2}$ is unbounded in $\delta$. Let $\delta_{i}<\delta_{i+1}$ be a cofinal sequence, for $i<\omega$. Then check that $\left\langle\left(\delta_{i}, \delta\right) \mid i<\omega\right\rangle$ is a $\prec$-descending sequence in $\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \upharpoonright \delta+1$. So $\alpha \leq \delta$. $\quad$ Q.E.D.

For $E$ a class of ordinals, let $E^{*}$ denote the class of its limit points.

Definition 3.7. Define by recursion on $0<\alpha \in \mathrm{On}$ the class $E^{\alpha}$ the class of $\alpha\left(-\Sigma_{2}\right)$-extendible ordinals:
$E^{1}=\left\{\left.{ }^{1} \zeta\right|^{1} \zeta\right.$ is extendible but not a limit of extendibles $\} ;$
$E^{\alpha+1}=\left\{\left.{ }^{\alpha} \zeta\right|^{\alpha} \zeta \in\left(E^{\alpha}\right)^{*} \cap E^{0}\right\} ;$
$E^{\lambda}=\bigcap_{\alpha<\lambda} E^{\alpha} \cap E^{0}$.
$E^{\geq \alpha}=\bigcup_{\beta \geq \alpha} E^{\beta}$ etc.

Here we decorate the variable $\zeta$ with the prefix indicating its level of extendability. We shall let ${ }^{\alpha} \Sigma$ indicate that for some ${ }^{\alpha} \zeta,\left({ }^{\alpha} \zeta,{ }^{\alpha} \Sigma\right)$ is an $\alpha$-extendible pair. Note that for any $\gamma$ the least element of $E^{\geq \alpha}$ greater than $\gamma$ is always an element of $E^{\alpha}$, i.e. is $\alpha$-extendible.

### 3.3 The Lengths of computations

We analyse the tree of subcomputations to define the notion of absolute length of the linearised absolute computation corresponding to some $P_{e}^{I}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$.

Definition 3.8. The local length of a computation $P_{e}^{I}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ in a type- 2 oracle $I$, is the least $\sigma_{0}$ (when defined) so that the snapshot at $\sigma_{0}$ is the repeat of some earlier snapshot $\zeta_{0}<\sigma_{0}$, and so that the snapshot at $\sigma_{0}$ recurs unboundedly in On .

The local length has all the relevant information then in the calculation: everything thereafter is mere repetition ( $\sigma_{0}$ will be undefined if $P_{e}^{I}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is divergent, that is, has an ill-founded computation tree). Another description of it is as the "top level" length of the computation, which disregards the lengths of the subcomputation calls below it. We now describe a computation recursive in the type-2 functional eJ. In fact we give a representation in terms of ITTM's. $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ will represent the $e$ 'th program in the usual format with appeal to oracle calls possible. We are thus considering computation of a partial function $\Phi_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}: ~}{ }^{k} \omega \times{ }^{l}\left({ }^{\omega} 2\right) \rightarrow{ }^{\omega} 2$. Such a computation may conventionally halt, or may go on for ever through the ordinals. The computation of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ proceeds in the usual ittm-fashion, working as TM at successor ordinals and taking liminf 's of cell values etc. at limit ordinals. At time $\alpha$ an oracle query may be initiated. We shall conventionally fix that the real being queried is that infinite string on the even numbered cells of the scratch type. If this string is $\left(f, y_{0}, y_{1} \ldots,\right)$ then the query is ?Does $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y)$ have eventually settled output tape?, and at stage $\alpha+1$ receives a $1 / 0$ value corresponding to "Yes/No" respectively. We thus regard eJ as the "eventual jump" and intend the following:

$$
\mathrm{eJ}=\left\{\langle\langle f, y\rangle, i\rangle \mid i=1 \text { and } P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y) \mid \text { or } i=0 \text { and and } P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y) \uparrow\right\}
$$

Here, $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y) \uparrow$ denotes that the computation $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y)$ loops but has no settled output, it is not the notation for a computation whose tree has an ill-founded branch. (Compare with above for the type-2 recursion in $J$ : divergence occurs if there is an illfounded-founded branch in the tree of evaluations.) As is intended, $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y)$ has the opportunity to make similar oracle calls, and we shall thus have a tree representation of calls made. We wish to represent the overall order of how such calls are made, and indeed the ordinal times of the various parts of the computation as it proceeds. Overall we have a 'depth first' mode of evaluation of a tree of subcomputations. We therefore make the following conventions. During the calculation of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ (the topmost node $\nu_{0}$ at Level 0 , in our tree $\mathfrak{T}=\mathfrak{T}(\boldsymbol{e}, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}))$ let us suppose the first oracle query concerning $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ is made at stage $\delta_{0}$. We write a node $\nu_{1}$ below $\nu_{0}$, and explicitly allow the computation $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ to be performed at this Level 1. The 'local time' for this computation, of course starts at $t=0$ - although each stage is also thought of as one more step in the overall computation of the computation immediately above: namely $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$. Suppose $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ makes no further oracle calls and the local length of $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ is $\sigma_{1}$. Control, and the correct $1 / 0$ bit is then passed back up to Level 0 , and the master computation proceeds.

We deem that $\delta_{0}+\sigma_{1}$ steps have occurred so far towards the final absolute length of the calculation $H=H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$, of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$.

However if $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ has made an oracle query, let us suppose the first such was ? $P_{f_{1}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{1}\right)$ ?, then a new node $\nu_{2}$ is placed below $\nu_{1}$. If this piece of computation at $\nu_{2}$ takes $\sigma_{2}$ steps without oracle calls, to cycle before control and the result is passed back up to $\nu_{1}$, (i.e. the local length of $P_{f_{1}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{1}\right)$ is $\sigma_{2}$ ) then those $\sigma_{2}$ steps will have to be be part of the overall length of calculation for $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ - although those $\sigma_{2}$ steps only counted for 1 step in the local length of $P_{f_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{0}\right)$ 's calculation. If the $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ converges then we shall have its computation tree $\mathfrak{T}=\mathfrak{T}(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$, a finite path tree (with potentially infinite branching) and some countable rank. $\mathfrak{T}$ will be labelled with nodes $\left\{\nu_{\iota}\right\}_{\iota<\eta(T)}$ that are visited by the computation in increasing order (with backtracking up the tree of the kind indicated). Thus $\nu_{\iota}$ is first visited only after all $\nu_{\tau}$ have been visited for $\tau<\iota$. The $\beta^{\prime}$ th oracle call to Level $k$ will generate a node placed to the right of those so far at Level $k$ (and thus to the right of those with lesser indices $\alpha<\beta$ at that level). The tree will thus have a linear leftmost branch, before any branching occurs.

Just as the Kleene equational calculus can be seen to build up in an inductive fashion a set of indices $\Omega[I]$ for successful computations recursive in $I$, (see Hinman [8], pp. 259-261) so we can define the graph of eJ as the fixed point of a monotone operator $\Delta$ on $\omega \times \omega^{<\omega} \times\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{<\omega} \times 2$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta(X)= & \left\{\langle\langle e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}\rangle, i\rangle \mid P_{e}^{X}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})\right. \text { is an ittm-computation making, and receiving, only oracle } \\
& \text { calls } \left.\left\langle\left\langle e^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{m}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right\rangle, i^{\prime}\right\rangle \in X \text { with } i=1 / 0 \text { if the resulting output is eventually settled or } n o t\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Let $\Delta^{0}=\varnothing ; \Delta^{\alpha+1}=\Delta\left(\Delta^{\alpha}\right) ; \Delta^{<\lambda}=\bigcup_{\alpha<\lambda} \Delta^{\alpha} \& \Delta^{\lambda}=\Delta\left(\Delta^{<\lambda}\right)$ in the usual way. Then the least fixed point of $\Delta$ is the function eJ.

Definition 3.9. With eJ as just defined:

$$
P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) \text { is convergent if }\langle e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}\rangle \in \operatorname{dom}(\mathrm{eJ}) \text {. Otherwise it is divergent. }
$$

Assuming $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ convergent, we may define by recursion a function $H\left(f_{i}, y_{i}\right)$ for $1 \leq \iota<$ $\eta(\mathfrak{T})$, giving that absolute length of the calculation at node $\nu_{\iota}$ taking into account the computations at nodes below it. Suppose the oracle queries made by $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ at Level 0 , were $P_{f_{\iota_{j}}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{\iota_{j}}\right)$ for $j<\theta$, and they were made at increasing local times $\delta_{j}$ for $j<\theta$ in $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$, then let $\overline{\delta_{i}}$ be defined by:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{\delta}_{0}=\delta_{0} ; \\
& \bar{\delta}_{j+1}=\delta_{j+1}-\delta_{j} ; \\
& \bar{\delta}_{\lambda}=\delta_{\lambda}-\sup \left\{\delta_{k} \mid k<\lambda\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

then the absolute length of the calculation is the wellordered ordinal sum:

$$
\begin{array}{rlrl}
H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}) & =\sum_{j=0}^{\theta}\left(\bar{\delta}_{j}+H\left(f_{\iota_{j}}, y_{\iota_{j}}\right)\right) \text { if } \theta>0 \\
& =\Sigma(\boldsymbol{x}) & \text { otherwise; }
\end{array}
$$

of course assuming by induction that the absolute lengths of the computations $H\left(f_{\iota j}, y_{\iota j}\right)$ have been similarly defined.

We call the master computation $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ together with all the subcomputations of the tree explicitly performed, the absolute computation (as opposed to the top level 'local computation' with simple 1 -step queries).

- It is possible, and easy, to design an index $f \in \omega$, so that $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(0)$ has absolute length $H(f, 0, \varnothing)$ greater than the looping length of the top level computation. Hence for performing a computation together with all its subcomputations as a tree, and seeing how the absolute computation relates to extendability in the $L$ hierarchy, this has to be done in suitably large admissible sets.

Lemma 3.10. Suppose $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is a convergent computation with tree $\mathfrak{T} \in M$, and with $\boldsymbol{x} \in M$, where $M$ is a transitive admissible set. Let $\theta=\mathrm{On}^{M}$. Suppose for every node $\nu_{\iota}$ in $\mathfrak{T}$ that the computation at the node $P_{f_{\iota} \mathrm{eJ}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(y_{\iota}\right)$ has local length $\psi_{\iota}<\theta$ (this includes the local length of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$, being at $\nu_{0}$, is some $\left.\psi_{0}<\theta\right)$. Then $H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})<\theta$.

Proof: The required ordinal sum can be performed by an induction on the rank of the nodes in the tree, setting $0=\operatorname{rank}\left(\nu_{\iota}\right)$, for those $\iota$ with $\nu_{\iota}$ a terminal point of a path leading downwards from $\nu_{0}$. This can be effected inside the admissible set $M$.
Q.E.D.

## Better:

Lemma 3.11. Suppose $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is a convergent computation with its computation tree $\mathfrak{T} \in M$, and with $\boldsymbol{x} \in M$, where $M$ is a transitive admissible set, closed under the function $x \mapsto \tilde{x}$. Let $\theta=\mathrm{On}^{M}$. Then $H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})<\theta$.

Proof: This is similar to the above. By induction on $\operatorname{rk}(\mathfrak{T})=\eta<\theta$. Note first that the closure of $M$ ensures that for all $y \in M$, that $\Sigma(y)<\theta$. Suppose true for all such trees of convergent computations $P_{f}(y)$ of smaller rank than $\eta$, for $y \in M$. Suppose $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ makes queries at local times $\left\langle\delta_{i} \mid i<\tau\right\rangle$ to nodes at Level 1 . Note that $\tau<\theta$ as $\mathfrak{T} \in M$. Suppose the calls are to the subtrees $\left\langle\mathfrak{T}_{i} \mid i<\tau\right\rangle$ with $\left(f_{i}, y_{i}\right)$ passed down at time $\delta_{i}$ and $\overline{y_{i}}$ is the real passed up at local time $\delta_{i}+1$. Let the snapshot at Level 0 at time $\gamma$ be $s(\gamma)$. (Thus we assume $s\left(\delta_{i}+1\right)$ contains the information of $\overline{y_{i}}$.) Now notice that $\delta_{0}<\Sigma(x)$ (because the computation prior to $\delta_{0}$ is (equivalent to) an ordinary ittm computation, which of course eventually converges at time $\Sigma(x)$.) If we set

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{\delta}_{0}=\delta_{0} ; \quad s_{0}=x \\
& \bar{\delta}_{j+1}=\delta_{j+1}-\delta_{j} ; s_{j+1}=s\left(\delta_{j}\right) \\
& \bar{\delta}_{\lambda}=\delta_{\lambda}-\sup \left\{\delta_{k} \mid k<\lambda\right\} ; s_{\lambda}=s\left(\sup \left\{\delta_{k} \mid k<\lambda\right\}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

then $\bar{\delta}_{j+1}<\Sigma\left(s_{j}\right)$ (as the time to the next query, if it exists, is always less than the least $s_{j}-2$ extendible by the same reasoning). Similarly $\bar{\delta}_{\lambda}<\Sigma\left(s_{\lambda}\right)$. By assumption on $M$, all such $\Sigma\left(s_{j}\right)$ are less than $\theta$. Consequently if $H\left(f_{i}, y_{i}\right)=\theta_{i}<\theta$, the whole length of the computation is bounded:

$$
H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})=\sum_{i=0}^{<\tau} \bar{\delta}_{i}+\theta_{i} \leq \sum_{i=0}^{<\tau} \Sigma\left(s_{i}\right)+\theta_{i}<\theta
$$

Q.E.D.

Definition 3.12. (i) The Level of the computation $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ at time $\alpha<H(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$, denoted $\Lambda(e,(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x}), \alpha)$, is the level of the node $\nu_{\iota}$ at which control is based at time $\alpha$, where:
(ii) the level of a node $\nu_{\iota}$ is the length of the path in the tree from $\nu_{0}$ to $\nu_{\iota}$.

Thus for a convergent computation, at any time the level is a finite number ('depth' would have been an equally good choice of word). A divergent computation is one in which $\mathfrak{T}(e, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{x})$ becomes illfounded (with a rightmost path of order type then $\omega$ ).

Lemma 3.13. The computation $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ converges if and only if there exists some $x-\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ so that $\Lambda(e, x, \zeta)=0$.

Proof: Suppose $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x) \mid$. If $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x) \downarrow$ conventionally then the conclusion is trivial as then for all sufficiently large $x$ - $\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pairs $(\zeta, \Sigma)$, the machine has halted at Level 0 . If otherwise, then the computation $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ will loop forever through the ordinals. But, using the definition of the liminf behaviour at limit stages, it is easy to argue that there is a cub subset $C \subseteq \omega_{1}$ of points $\alpha, \beta$ with the snapshots of the computation at these times identical, and with $\Lambda(e, x, \alpha)=\Lambda(e, x, \beta)=0$. Now find a pair $\left(\zeta, \Sigma^{\prime}\right)$ both in $C$, with $L_{\zeta}[x] \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\Sigma^{\prime}}[x]$. Now minimise $\Sigma^{\prime}$ to a $\Sigma>\zeta$ with $L_{\zeta}[x] \prec \Sigma_{2} L_{\Sigma}[x]$, thus $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ is as required.

Conversely: if it is the case that $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x) \downarrow$ the conclusion is trivial, so suppose otherwise and that $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ is some $x$ - $\Sigma_{2}$-extendible pair satisfying the right hand side. By $\Sigma_{2}$-extendibility, $\Lambda(e, x, \Sigma)$ is also 0 . By the liminf rule the snapshot of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ - which we can envisage running inside $L_{\Sigma}[x]$ - at time $\zeta$ is $\Sigma_{2}^{L_{\zeta}[x]}(x)$. Again by $\Sigma_{2}$-extendibility, it is the same at time $\Sigma$. Notice that any cell of the tape, $C_{i}$ say, that changes its value even once in the interval $(\zeta, \Sigma)$, will, by $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection, do so unboundedly in both $\zeta$ and $\Sigma$. Consequently we have final looping behaviour in the interval $[\zeta, \Sigma]$. Hence we have our criterion for ' eJ -convergence'.
Q.E.D.

Lemma 3.14. Suppose we have a 2-nesting $\zeta_{0}<\zeta_{1}<\Sigma_{1}<\Sigma_{0}$. Suppose at time $\zeta_{0}$ of the absolute computation of $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ either $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ or a subcomputation thereof, is not yet convergent and is at level $k$ of its computation tree. Then at time $\zeta_{1}$ it is not yet convergent and control is at a level $\geq k+1$.

Proof: Suppose $k=0$. By $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection and the liminf rule, $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ is still running, and control is still at depth $k$ at $\Sigma_{0}$. This mean the snapshots at $\zeta_{0}$ and $\Sigma_{0}$ are identical and thus $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ has its first loop at $\left(\zeta_{0}, \Sigma_{0}\right)$, and the computation is convergent, and is then effectively over. Suppose for a contradiction that control is at level 0 also at $\zeta_{1}$ (and again also at $\Sigma_{1}$ ). So again $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ has looping snapshots at $\left(\zeta_{1}, \Sigma_{1}\right)$. However this is a $\Sigma_{1}$-fact about $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ that $L_{\Sigma_{0}}$ sees: "There exists a 2extendible pair $(\bar{\zeta}, \bar{\Sigma})$ with $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ having identical snaphots at level 0 at $(\bar{\zeta}, \bar{\Sigma})$." But then there is such a pair $\bar{\zeta}<\bar{\Sigma}<\Sigma_{0}$ and $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ 's computation is again convergent at $\bar{\Sigma}$ contrary to assumption.

The argument for $k \geq 1$ is very similar: if $\liminf _{\alpha \rightarrow \zeta_{0}} \Lambda(e, m, \alpha)=\Lambda\left(e, m, \zeta_{0}\right)=k$, then $\liminf _{\alpha \rightarrow \Sigma_{0}} \Lambda\left(P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m), \alpha\right)=k$ also. Again, if it entered the interval $\left(\zeta_{1}, \Sigma_{1}\right)$ at this same level $k$ it would loop there, and by the same reflection argument applied repeatedly would do so not just once but unboundedly below $\zeta_{0}$ at the same level $k$. But after each successful loop at level $k$, control passes up to level $k-1$. However then $\liminf _{\alpha \rightarrow \zeta_{0}} \Lambda(e, m, \alpha)=k-1$. Contradiction!
Q.E.D.

Lemma 3.15. (Boundedness Lemma for computations recursive in eJ) Let $\beta_{0}$ be the least infinitely nested ordinal in some ill-founded model $M$ with $\operatorname{WFP}(M)=L_{\beta_{0}}$. Let $\alpha_{0}$ be least with $L_{\alpha_{0}} \prec \Sigma_{1} L_{\beta_{0}}$. Then any computation $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ which is not convergent by time $\alpha_{0}$, is divergent.

Proof: Let $\zeta_{0}<\cdots<\zeta_{n}<\cdots \beta_{0} \cdots \subset s_{n} \subset \cdots \subset s_{0}$ witness the infinite nesting at $\beta_{0}$ in $M$. By the definition of $\alpha_{0}$ no $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ is convergent at a time $\alpha \in\left[\alpha_{0}, \beta_{0}\right)$ as this would be a $\Sigma_{1}$-fact true in $L_{\beta_{0}}$; but then by $\Sigma_{1}$-reflection, it is true in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. But if $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ is not divergent before $\beta_{0}$, it will be by $\beta_{0}$ : the previous lemma shows that $\Lambda\left(e, m, \zeta_{n}\right)<\Lambda\left(e, m, \zeta_{n+1}\right)$ holds in $M$. But these level facts are absolute to $V$, as they are grounded just on the part of the absolute computation tree being built in $L_{\beta_{0}}$ as time goes towards $\beta_{0}$ (and are not dependent on oracle information from $\mathrm{eJ}^{M}$ which perforce will differ from the true eJ); so $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ 's computation tree will have an illfounded branch at time $\beta_{0}$.
Q.E.D.

The above then shows that the initial segment $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ of the $L$-hierarchy contains all the information concerning looping or convergence of computations of the form $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$. A computation may then continue through the wellfounded part of the computation tree for the times $\beta<\beta_{0}$ but if so, it will be divergent. Relativisations to real inputs $\vec{x}$ are then straightforward by defining $\beta_{0}(\vec{x})$ as the least such that there is an infinite nesting based at that ordinal in the $L[\vec{x}]$ hierarchy etc.

Lemma 3.16. Let $x \subseteq \omega$. Then $T_{\Sigma(x)}^{2}(x)={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \Sigma_{2}-\operatorname{Th}\left(L_{\Sigma(x)}[x]\right)$ is eJ-recursive in $x$.
Proof: There is an index $e$ so that running $P_{e}(x)$ asks in turn if $? n \in T_{\Sigma(x)}^{2}(x)$ ? for each $n$, and will receive a $0 / 1$ answer from the oracle eJ. Consequently $P_{e}$ may compute this theory on its output tape, and then halt.
Q.E.D.

Remark: $T_{\Sigma(x)}^{2}(x) \equiv_{1} \tilde{x}$ (by Fact 2 (iii) above).
Lemma 3.17. Let $x \subseteq \omega$. Then a code for $L_{\Sigma(x)}[x]$ is eJ-recursive in $x$.
Proof: There is a standard ittm program that on input $\tilde{x}$ will halt after writing as output a code for $L_{\Sigma(x)}[x]$. Thus, by the last remark and lemma, a code for $L_{\Sigma(x)}[x]$ is also eJ-recursive in $x$. Q.E.D.

Further:

- (i) For any $e, x$, the first repeating snapshot $s(e, x)$ of $P_{e}(x)$ is eJ-computable in $x$, as is a code for $L_{\rho_{0}}[x], L_{\rho_{1}}[x]$ and $L_{\rho_{1}^{+}}[x]$ where $\rho_{0}, \rho_{1}$ are the ordinal stages of appearance of the first repeating snapshot $s(e, x)$, and $\rho_{1}^{+}$is the least $\bar{\rho}>\rho_{1}$ which is a limit of $s(e, x)$-admissibles.
- We may thus have subroutines that ask for, and compute such objects during the computation of some $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(y)$ say. Since satisfaction is also ittm-computable, we may query simply whether $? L_{\rho_{1}}[x] \vDash \sigma$ ? and receive an answer.

One may show:

Theorem 3.18. Any two of the functionals $E, \mathrm{eJ}$, and iJ are mutually ittm-recursive in each other.

Proof: This uses, in the direction to obtain iJ or eJ recursive in $E$, an appropriate version of the Normal Form Theorem from [19].
Q.E.D.

We collect together some of the above Facts and results, in order to abbreviate our descriptions of algorithms This will help to have a library of basic algorithms which we shall simply quote as being 'recursive in eJ' without further justification.

Definition 3.19. (Basic Computations-BC) (i) Any standard ittm-computation $P_{e}(n, x)$ is Basic.
(ii) If a code for an $\alpha$ ordinal is given, then the computations that compute: a) for any $x$ (a code for) $L_{\alpha}[x] b$ ) the satisfaction relation for $L_{\alpha}[x]$ is Basic (in (the code for) $\alpha$ ); (and shows those objects are eJ-recursive, if $\alpha$ is).

The following are all eJ-recursive, and Basic:
(iii) The function $x \longmapsto \tilde{x}$;
(iv) The function that computes $x \longmapsto \Sigma(x)$, the larger of the next extendible pair in $x$;
(v) The function that computes $x \longmapsto \Sigma(x)^{+}$;
(vi) Any others that we may need to add.

Stronger ordinals than simply $\Sigma(x)^{+}$can be eJ-recursive:
Lemma 3.20. There is a recursive sequence of indices $\left\langle e_{i} \mid 0 \leq i<\omega\right\rangle$ so that for any $\alpha<\omega_{1}$ with a code $x \in 2^{\mathbb{N}}, P_{e_{i}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ computes a code for the next $i$-extendible ${ }^{i} \zeta>\alpha$.

Proof: For $i=0$ this has been done using Basic Computations. Suppose $e_{i}$ has been defined, and we describe the programme $P_{e_{i+1}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$. Assume without loss of generality that $\alpha=0, x=$ const $_{0}$. Then $P_{e_{i}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(0)$ computes a code for the least $i$-extendible, $\zeta_{0}:={ }^{i} \zeta$ say. By a basic computation let a slice of the scratch tape $R$ be designated to hold $T_{\zeta_{0}}^{2} ; R:=T_{\zeta_{0}}^{2}$. A code for $\zeta_{0}$ is recursive in $T_{\zeta_{0}}^{2}$. Now compute $P_{e_{i}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(R)$. This yields the next $i$-extendible $\zeta_{1}={ }^{i} \zeta_{1}$. Now, using Basic Computations, write successively to $R$ the theories $T_{\zeta_{0}}^{2}, T_{\zeta_{0}+1}^{2}, \ldots, T_{\zeta_{0}+\beta}^{2}, \ldots$ for $\beta<\zeta_{1}$. We note that at limit stages $\lambda \leq \zeta_{1}$, $R$ will contain "liminf" theories $\hat{T}_{\lambda}=\operatorname{Liminf}_{\alpha \rightarrow \lambda} T_{\alpha}^{2}$ (by the usual automatic ittm liminf process) but that $T_{\lambda}^{2}$ is uniformly r.e. in $\hat{T}_{\lambda}$. (For the latter see Fact 2 . It is easy to argue that $\hat{T}_{\lambda} \supseteq T_{\lambda}^{2}$, and that if $\sup S_{\lambda}^{1}=\lambda$ then we have equality, it is the bounded case of $S_{\lambda}^{1}$ in $\lambda$ that requires argument. The point of this exercise of writing theories to $R$ is to ensure continuability of the computation, and that we do not start to loop too early. The 'writing out' of all levels of the theories to $R$, is a precautionary step: in general we do not have $\hat{T}_{i+1} \zeta=\liminf _{\zeta \rightarrow{ }_{i}{ }^{i+1} \zeta} \hat{T}_{i}$. ) And again a code for $\lambda$ is then recursive in $T_{\lambda}^{2}$.

Set $R:=\hat{T}_{\zeta_{1}}$; by the comments just made $T_{\zeta_{1}}^{2}$ is r.e. in $R$ and $R \in L_{\zeta_{1}+1}$ (this is why we are writing out these theories, to ensure that we loop at our desired target); now compute $P_{e_{i}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(R)$ and repeat this process. As there is no means for the machine to halt, there is a least looping pair $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ of ordinals. Let $\left({ }^{i+1} \zeta,{ }^{i+1} \Sigma\right)$ be the least $i+1$-extendible pair. We claim that this is the pair $(\zeta, \Sigma)$. Suppose $\zeta<{ }^{i+1} \zeta$. By the repetition of the contents of $R$ in the loop points, we have $\hat{T}_{\zeta}=\hat{T}_{\Sigma}$, in the above algorithm, hence $T_{\zeta}^{2}=T_{\Sigma}^{2}$, and thus $L_{\zeta} \prec_{\Sigma_{2}} L_{\Sigma}$. But then $\zeta$ is an extendible limit of $i$ extendibles, as $\zeta$ is a limit point of this looping process. This contradicts the minimality of ${ }^{i+1} \zeta$. Hence $\zeta$ equals the latter, and $\Sigma={ }^{i+1} \Sigma$ follows.

Hence we may compute $\hat{T}_{i+1}{ }^{\prime},{ }^{i+1} \zeta$ by means of an eventually stabilizing looping programme. We let $P_{e_{i+1}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ be the programme just described followed by the basic comp. that finds a code for ${ }^{i+1} \zeta$ by a method uniformly r.e. in $\hat{T}_{i+1}{ }_{\zeta}$.

Finally note that the continuing description of the programme $P_{e_{i+2}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ from $P_{e_{i+1}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ merely repeats the above but altering only a few indices. We may thus determine a recursive function $i \mapsto e_{i+1}$.
Q.E.D.

Entirely similar is:
Lemma 3.21. There is a (Turing) recursive sequence of indices $\left\langle e_{i}^{\prime} \mid i<\omega\right\rangle$ so that $P_{e_{i}^{\prime}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ writes a code for ${ }^{i} \Sigma(x)$, the least $\Sigma_{2}$-extension of $L_{i \zeta}[x]$.

## 4 The determinacy results

We shall assume a certain amount of familiarity of working with ittm's and shortcuts amounting to certain subroutines, so as not to overload the reader with details.

Theorem 4.1. For any $\Sigma_{3}^{0}$ game $G(A ; T)$, (with $T$ say recursive) if player I has a winning strategy, then there is such a strategy recursive in eJ; if player II has a winning strategy, then there is such a strategy either recursive in eJ, or else definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$.

## Proof of 4.1

Idea: We suppose $A=\bigcup_{n} B_{n}$ with each $B_{n} \in \Pi_{2}^{0}$, with an initial game tree $T$. For expository purposes we shall assume that $T={ }^{<\omega} \omega$ - relativisations will be straightforward. We shall provide an outline of a procedure which is recursive in eJ and which will either provide a strategy for $I$ in $G(A ; T)$ (if such exists) or else will diverge in the attempt to find a strategy for II. We wish to apply the main Lemma 3 of [20] for the successive $B_{n}$. The control of the procedure will be at different Levels of the initial finite path tree of the computation. At Level 0 will be the main process, but also the procedure for finding witnesses and strategies involved in the arguments for the Main Lemma applied with $B=B_{0}$. We first search for a level in the $L$-hierarchy whose code is eJ-recursive and for which we can define a non-losing subtree $T^{\prime} \subseteq T$, for which all $p \in T^{\prime}$ have witnesses $\hat{T}_{p}$ to $p$ 's goodness in the sense of (i) and (ii) above. In fact we shall search for pairs of levels in the $L$ hierarchy, in the sequel, between which we have absoluteness of our non-losing subtrees. After having found such, this data will be encoded as a real (these routine details, the reader will be pleased to learn, we omit) and a subroutine call made to a process at the lower Level 1 which will attempt to find the right witnesses etc. to apply the Lemma for $B=B_{1}$. We now search for a further level of the $L$-hierarchy which again has the right witnesses to goodness to all the possible relevant subtrees associated with positions $p_{2}$ of length 2 . As we search for such an $L_{\alpha}$, we may find that some of our original witnesses to goodness at Level 0 no longer work in our new $L_{\alpha}$, or even more simply that our $T^{\prime}$ from Level 0 now has nodes $p$ which have become winning for $I$ in this $L_{\alpha}$. We accordingly keep testing the data handed down to see if any of it has become 'faulty' in this respect. If so, then we throw away everything we have done at Level 1, but pass control back up to Level 0 together with the ordinal height of the current $L_{\alpha}$ we reached. We then go back to searching for an $L_{\alpha^{\prime}}$ which is 'good' in all of these previous respects at Level 0 for a new $T^{\prime}$, which we then shall pass down to Level 1 for another attempt.

Eventually we shall reach a stage where we have a sufficiently large model where all the data and our witnessing subtrees work at both levels 0 and 1 . Accordingly again all this data is passed down to the subroutine at Level 2 for assessing potential subtrees for application in the Lemma to be applied for $B=B_{2}$. Proceeding in this fashion, testing as we go the validity of our data trees en route and passing back up to the Level of the tree that has failed if so, we find we work at increasing depth that is at lower Levels $n$ with increasing $n$. If $I I$ has a winning strategy then there will be an infinite path descending through all the Levels and hence the computation will diverge. One point will be to remark that if $I$ has a winning strategy then this process will discover it: this requires us checking that we don't come up against a 'wall' in the ordinals $\alpha$ so that we cannot find a code for an ordering of a longer order type - because our computation has stabilized, or in other words is in a loop, and we are stuck below the length of that loop.

Hence if there is no such wall, and $G(A ; T)$ has a winning strategy for II only definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$. then we can theoretically keep computing ordinals up to $\beta_{0}$.

Our task now is to achieve a balance between giving enough of these details that the reader is convinced, and without causing the eye to glaze over with overwhelming (and unnecessary) minutiae.

In general: given a tree $S$ in a model $M$, used in a game $G(\bar{A}, S)$, and without a strategy for player $I$ in $M$, then we shall denote the subtree of non-losing positions for $I I$ in $M$ by $S^{M}$ (or just $S^{\prime}$ ). For $R \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}), \tau^{+}(R)$ will denote the sup of the first $\omega$ many $R$-admissibles beyond $\tau$. By $\Sigma^{k}(R)$ we shall mean, where $\zeta^{k}(R)$ is the least $k$-extendible in the $L_{\alpha}[R]$ hierarchy, that $\Sigma^{k}(R)$ is the least ordinal with $L_{\zeta^{k}(R)}[R] \prec_{\Sigma_{2}} L_{\Sigma^{k}(R)}[R]$. If $k=1$ we drop it and write simply $\zeta(R)$ etc. We note that if $L_{\Sigma^{+}(R)}[R]$ has no proper $\Sigma_{1}$-substructures, then $T_{\Sigma^{+}(R)}^{1}[R]={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \Sigma_{1}-\mathrm{Th}\left(L_{\Sigma^{+}(R)}[R]\right)$ - in the language of set theory with a predicate symbol for $R$ - is not in $L_{\Sigma^{+}(R)}[R]$; moreover (ordinarily) recursive in $T_{\Sigma^{+}(R)}^{1}[R]$ is a wellorder of type $\Sigma^{+}(R)$. We shall let the notation ${ }^{\alpha} M$ vary over structures of the form $L_{\alpha_{\Sigma}+}[T]$.
[Commentary is provided in square brackets following a \% sign.]
As a warm-up we prove the following lemma using just Basic Computations.
Lemma 4.2. There is a computation that on input codes for $T,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle$ will halt either with a winning strategy for I, or else with an encoded $T^{\prime}$ - the set of non-losing positions for II in $G(A ; T)$ - membership of which is absolute between some $L_{\zeta}[T]$ and $L_{\Sigma^{+}}[T]$.
(0): We commence with cutting up recursive infinite disjoint slices of the scratch tape to be reserved as 'registers'for the reals coding $\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle, T, T^{\prime}, \Sigma^{+}, \ldots$, (and more such will be needed at lower Levels, as data is passed down in the argument that follows, but we shall not mention these, rather leave it to the reader to do the preparatory mental scissor work).

- Set: $T^{\prime}:=T$.
(1) - Compute: $M:=L_{\Sigma^{+}\left(T^{\prime}\right)}\left[T^{\prime}\right]$, and set $\Sigma^{+}:=\Sigma^{+}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.
$\bullet ? T^{{ }^{M}}=\varnothing ?$ If $T^{T^{M}}=\varnothing$ then (I has a winning strategy in $\left.G(A ; T)\right)^{M}$, and this may be found in $M$ and printed out on the output tape; then STOP. Otherwise CONTINUE.
[\% As $M$ is a model of KPI such a winning strategy is winning in $V$.]
- ? Is $T^{\prime M}=T^{\prime}$ ?
(2) •If NO then $T^{\prime} \supset T^{\prime M}$ and then some winning strategies are newly available to I in $M$ that are for some $p \in T^{\prime} \backslash T^{\prime M}$. Set $T^{\prime}:=T^{\prime M} ;$ GOTO (1).
[\% Note that the new $T^{\prime}$ is a proper subtree of the old.]
- If YES, then we may STOP with a suitable $T^{\prime}$ encoded in its register.
[\% Of course in order to obtain $M, \Sigma^{+}$, etc. this officially requires a call to a subcomputation at the next level down, but the above is just a schematic description of the process, and so we suppress that level of detail. The point is that the $T^{\prime}$ are a decreasing sequence of sets. Hence keeping track of these $T^{\prime}$ at the top level suffices for the procedure to continue: we don't need to keep track of, e.g., the ordinals heights of the structures $M$, and the concomitant worries about the liminf action at limit stages. Thus the above can be all effected using Basic Computations (and variants thereon).]

Claim 1 Either the program halts with a winning strategy for I in $G(A ; T)$ or, at some point strictly before the next 2-extendible above $\Sigma^{+}(T)$ in the cycle, the answer to the query ? Is $T^{\prime M}=T^{\prime}$ ? is affirmative.

Proof: Note first that the computation uses only BC's and each of these only require a computation of length the next extendible pair at most. Suppose $\left(\zeta_{0}, \Sigma_{0}\right)$ is any extendible pair that is a limit of such, above $\Sigma^{+}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$. We imagine the computation as being performed as a $\Sigma_{2}$-recursion in $T$ in $L_{\Sigma_{0}}$. Then suppose, for a contradiction, that by the $\zeta_{0}$ 'th turn through the cycle, we have not had an affirmative answer. In the $\nu^{\prime}$ th turn through the cycle (for $\nu<\zeta_{0}$ ) let $T^{\prime}$ be denoted by $T_{\nu}^{\prime}$. Then the $T_{\nu}^{\prime}$, as remarked, are strictly decreasing. Now by an easy reflection argument, one sees that on a tail of $\nu<\zeta_{0}$, the $T_{\nu}^{\prime}$ must be the same. [If " $\forall \nu \exists \nu^{\prime}>\nu \exists p\left(p \in T_{\nu^{\prime}}^{\prime} \backslash T_{\nu^{\prime}+1}^{\prime}\right)$ " holds in $L_{\zeta_{0}}$ it will also hold in $L_{\Sigma_{0}}$. But if $p_{0} \in T_{\nu^{\prime}}^{\prime} \backslash T_{\nu^{\prime}+1}^{\prime}$ the $\nu^{\prime}$ for which that happens is $\Sigma_{2}$-definable in $L_{\Sigma_{0}}$ from $p_{0}$; but that implies $\nu^{\prime}<\zeta_{0}$. This contradicts the quoted formula.] So an affirmative answer must have occurred.
Q.E.D. Claim 1 \& Lemma]

We now assemble these building blocks to form a programme based on the argument of the proof of Theorem 2.7 surveyed above.

## Proof of Theorem 4.1:

We outline the argument at the various levels of computation in the oracle calls of a master computation at level $\Lambda=0$. We proceed by describing the actions of the programmes being called, which the reader may reformulate as official queries to the eJ-functional as oracle. At the end of the description we justify the claim that this is a bona fide eJ-recursion.
(1) $\Lambda=0$.

- The master or control programme computes successively lengthening structures ${ }^{1} M=L_{\Sigma^{+}}\left[T^{\prime}\right]$ until $T^{\prime}$ is seen to stabilize between one such structure ${ }^{1} M$ and the next, ${ }^{1} M^{\prime}$.
[\% This we saw done effectively by a machine in the proof of Lemma 4.2, with $T^{\prime}$ so stabilizing before the next 2 -extendible. This process involved oracle queries to Level $\Lambda=1$, but again we suppress these details.]
- With $T^{\prime}$ stabilized, the programme asks the following - when suitably formulated - oracle query of eJ. The query sub-computation we view as enacted at $\Lambda=1$. We suppose that it is the computation $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ where $x=\left\langle 1,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}, \mathbb{T}^{0},{ }^{1} M\right\rangle$ (suitably coded), whose action is described below starting at (2).
$Q^{1}$ : ? Defining $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ from the current $T^{\prime}$ in $\mathbb{T}^{0}$, do all the trees in $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ become eventually settled ?
[\% Recall that the trees of $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ are of the form:
a) $\hat{T}_{p} \quad\left(={ }_{\mathrm{df}}\right.$ the current ${ }^{1} M$-least witness to the goodness of $\left.p \in T^{\prime}\right)$ and
b) $\left(\hat{T}_{p}\right)^{\prime}\left(={ }_{\text {df }}\right.$ its tree of non-losing positions for $\left.I I\right)$; as well as (where $T^{*}(\varnothing)$ is set to $\left.\hat{T}_{\varnothing}\right)$
c) $T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}$ and $\left(\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$ for relevant $p_{2}$.

We adopt the convention, that " $\mathbb{T}^{l}$ becomes eventually settled " or " $\mathbb{T}^{l}$ is stable up to ordinal $\tau$ " to be a shorthand affirming that all the constituent trees of the family $\mathbb{T}^{l}$ are stable per their definitions up to $\tau$.

Note also: that since $T^{\prime}$ has survived intact from one ${ }^{1} M$ structure to the next ${ }^{1} M^{\prime}$ say, we can deploy the 'survival argument' of Lemma 2.12; this means that both structures see that all $p \in T^{\prime}$ are good, and this is a sufficient criterion for the definition of $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ over ${ }^{1} M$ to instantiate all the needed trees, which then exist in ${ }^{1} M$ (indeed $\left(\mathbb{T}^{1}\right)^{1} M \subseteq\left(L_{1_{\zeta}}\right)^{1} M$ ). Hence the query is therefore immediately meaningful. ]
(2) $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ answers the query by first taking from $x$ the current data, and on seeing the initial flag 1 , computes successive models ${ }^{1} M$, and keeps a register of the successive theories $T_{\alpha}^{2}$, of increasing ordinal height in the manner of the proof of Lemma 3.20. These operations are using our BC's.

If (Case 0 ): An ${ }^{1} M$ is reached that contains a winning strategy $\sigma$ for $I$ in $G(A ; T)$ then the programme HALTS and passes $x^{\prime}=\langle\sigma\rangle$ back up to the master programme at $\Lambda=0$;

If (Case 1): $T^{\prime}$ changes from one structure ${ }^{1} M$ to the next (" $T^{\prime}$ becomes unstable") then the programme HALTS and with the current $\mathbb{T}^{0}=\left\langle T, T^{\prime}{ }^{1} M\right\rangle$, passes the current $x^{\prime}=\left\langle 1,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}\right.$, $\left.\mathbb{T}^{0},{ }^{1} M\right\rangle$ back up to the master programme at $\Lambda=0$; and RETURNS TO (1);

If (Case 2): $T^{\prime}$ remains stable but some $S \in \mathbb{T}^{1}$ does not by the end of the eventual loop in $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$, then the answer to $Q^{1}$ is "No" (or " 0 ") and $x^{\prime}=\langle 0\rangle$ and control are passed back up to the master programme at $\Lambda=0$.

In Case 0 , the Master programme halts with this $\sigma$ as output.
[ $\%$ note that as $M$ is closed under admissibles, $\sigma$ is a w.s. for $I$ in $V$.]
In Case 1, the Master programme continues to calculate successive models, re-starting from the $M$ passed up in $x^{\prime}$.

In Case 2, the Master programme, on receiving "No", and using BC's, computes the length of the loop just passed, call it $\Sigma$, and then continues calculating successive models, with the first such in this series containing the ordinal $\Sigma$.
[\% Note that: (A) $T^{\prime}$ must become eventually settled under the repeated calculation of longer $M$ 's by the time of the next (or indeed any) larger element ${ }^{2} \zeta \in E^{2}$, or ${ }^{\alpha} \zeta(\alpha \geq 2)$ for that matter. Hence the loop $(1) \longrightarrow(2)$ (Case 1$) \longrightarrow(1)$ will be broken out of by the time the length of the models $M$ approaches the next ${ }^{2} \zeta$.
(B) For Case 2: we cannot immediately deploy a shrinking argument on the trees to conclude that we have stability of all trees in $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ by the next extendible, since the actual underlying trees $\hat{T}_{p}, T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}$ may be changing. However the eventual loop $\Sigma$ whose length the Master programme computes, is that of a 2-extendible in $E^{2}$; this is ensured by the writing out of the theories $T_{\alpha}^{2}$ in the manner of the argument of the proof of Lemma 3.20. If the loop (1) $\longrightarrow(2)($ Case 2$) \longrightarrow(1)$ repeatedly occurs from some point on, then for all sufficiently large ${ }^{2} \Sigma$ below the next ${ }^{3} \zeta$ (and so also by $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection, below the ${ }^{3} \Sigma$ corresponding to ${ }^{3} \zeta$ ). There is $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ so that (for all sufficiently large $\left.{ }^{1} \Sigma<^{2} \Sigma\right)\left(\mathbb{T}^{1}=\left(\mathbb{T}^{1}\right)^{L_{1}} \Sigma\right)$ and so we shall end up in Case 3 below. ]

The last possibility is:
(Case 3): All $S \in \mathbb{T}^{1}$ become stable between two successive ${ }^{1} M$-structures, $M_{1}, M_{2}$.

The sub-computation now makes in turn a further query sub-computation which in turn we view as enacted at $\Lambda=2$. We suppose that it is the computation $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ where we collect the current values

$$
\left.\mathbb{T}^{1}=\left\langle\left\langle\hat{T}_{p} \mid p \in T^{\prime}\right\rangle,\left\langle\left(\hat{T}_{p}\right)^{\prime} \mid p \in T^{\prime}\right\rangle,\left\langle T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}},\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}\right| p_{2} \text { relevant }\right\rangle\right\rangle
$$

and set:

$$
x=\left\langle 2,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}, \mathbb{T}^{0}, \mathbb{T}^{1}, M_{1}\right\rangle
$$

and where the query is:
$Q^{2}$ : ? Defining $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ from the current $\mathbb{T}^{0}, \mathbb{T}^{1}$ of $x$, do all the trees $S$ in $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ become eventually settled ?
[\% Just as following $Q^{1}$, the stability of all the trees $\left(\hat{T}_{p}\right)^{\prime}$ and $\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$ from one model to the next guarantees the existence of all the trees of $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ by the survival argument. ]
(3) $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ is programmed so that when it takes from $x$ the current data, and sees the initial flag 2 , it will continue to compute successive models ${ }^{2} M$, (which it can by Lemma 3.21) and write out theories as before, using Basic Comps, but now act as follows.

If (Case 0 ): $\mathrm{A}^{2} M$ contains a winning strategy $\sigma$ for $I$ in $G(A ; T)$ then this sub-computation HALTS and passes $x^{\prime}=\langle\sigma\rangle$ back up to the programme at $\Lambda=1$;

If (Case 1): $T^{\prime}$ becomes unstable, then the subcomputation HALTS and passes the current $x^{\prime}=$ $\left\langle 0, T, T^{\prime},{ }^{2} M\right\rangle$ back up to the programme at $\Lambda=1$;

If (Case 2): $T^{\prime}$ remains stable but some $S \in \mathbb{T}^{1}$ does not at some stage, between two successive models ${ }^{2} M_{1},{ }^{2} M_{2}$, then the subcomputation HALTS and the current $x^{\prime}=\left\langle 2,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n},\left(\mathbb{T}^{0}\right.\right.$, $\left.\left.\mathbb{T}^{1}\right)^{2} M_{2},{ }^{2} M_{2}\right\rangle$ with the current values of the data, and control, are passed back up to $\Lambda=1$;

If (Case 3): $T^{\prime}$ and all $S \in \mathbb{T}^{1}$ remain stable but some $S \in \mathbb{T}^{2}$ do not, then the answer to $Q^{2}$ is "No".

In Cases 0,1 the relevant information will be passed up in turn to the master computation at $\Lambda=0$ and will be acted on appropriately.

In Case 2, the sub-computation at $\Lambda=1$, restarts using BC's, and computes structures ${ }^{1} M$ as at (2).

In Case 3, the sub-computation at $\Lambda=1$, is programmed to use BC's, to compute the length of the loop just passed, say to $\Sigma$, and then continues calculating successive models in the usual manner as at (2), with the first such in this series containing the ordinal $\Sigma$.
[\% Note that: the comments on the loops at (A), (B) will hold here. Additionally:
$(\mathrm{C})$ If the loop $(2) \longrightarrow(3)$ (Case 3$) \longrightarrow(2)$ occurs from some point on, then for sufficiently large ${ }^{3} \Sigma$ below the next ${ }^{4} \zeta$, (and so also by $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection, below the corresponding ${ }^{4} \Sigma$ ) there is $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ so that (for sufficiently large ${ }^{2} \Sigma<^{3} \Sigma\left(\mathbb{T}^{2}=\mathbb{T}^{2}\right)^{L_{2}}$ ) and so we shall end up in Case 4 below.

The last possibility is:
(Case 4): $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ becomes stable between two successive ${ }^{2} M$-structures, $M_{1}, M_{2}$.

Again, the current sub-computation makes a query sub-computation which in turn we view as enacted at $\Lambda=3$. We suppose that it is the computation $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ where we set

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left.\mathbb{T}^{2}=\left\langle\hat{T}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p}, \hat{T}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p}^{\prime} \mid p \in\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}\right\rangle,\left\langle T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p_{4}},\left(T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p_{4}}\right)^{\prime}\right| p_{4} \text { relevant }\right\rangle \quad \text { and } \\
x=\left\langle 3,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}, \mathbb{T}^{0}, \mathbb{T}^{1}, \mathbb{T}^{2}, M_{2}\right\rangle
\end{gathered}
$$

and where the query is:
$Q^{3}$ : ? Defining $\mathbb{T}^{3}$ from the current $\mathbb{T}^{0}, \mathbb{T}^{1}, \mathbb{T}^{2}$ in $x$, does $\mathbb{T}^{3}$ become eventually settled ?

We hope the reader will have seen the pattern emerging in this description of the programme $P_{e_{0}}$. However the reader is entitled to ask: have we described a genuine programme for such oracle machines? And secondly, what is the outcome?

A typical 3-nesting diagram is at Figure 1 below. $T^{\prime}$ is assumed to be stable up to $\Sigma_{3}$. Thus beyond the branch given, there are no winning strategies for $I$ for any $T_{p}^{\prime}$ for any $p \in T$ appearing in the interval beyond the branch point up to $\Sigma_{3}$ (but such may appear in $L_{\Sigma_{3}+1}$ ). Because $T^{\prime}$ is this long-lived at positions labelled $P$, we can have all the relevant trees $\left(\hat{T}_{p}\right)^{\prime}, T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}$ and $\left(\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$ (i.e. $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ ) occurring, and themselves are stable up to the end of the extendible loop below which they occur. At the first 2 -nesting illustrated because all the $\left(\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$ at $P$ survive to the end of the outermost nesting, and so beyond the top of the inner nesting, we may conclude that at a position such as $Q$, all the relevant trees $T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p_{4}},\left(T^{*}\left(p_{2}\right)_{p_{4}}\right)^{\prime}$ of $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ occur below the inner extendible $\zeta$ that starts the inner nesting loop. The analysis at the 3-nesting is similar: since $T^{\prime}$ survives beyond $\Sigma_{2}$, the $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ trees can be found at locations $P$; as the $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ trees, $\left(\hat{T}_{p}\right)^{\prime}, T^{*}(\varnothing)_{p_{2}}$ and $\left(\left(T^{*}(\varnothing)\right)_{p_{2}}\right)^{\prime}$, survive beyond $\Sigma_{1}$, the $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ trees can be found at locations $Q$. If we had assumed that $T^{\prime}$ survived beyond $\Sigma_{1}$ then we could have obtained a shift, with the $\mathbb{T}^{1}$ trees obtainable at $R$, the $\mathbb{T}^{2}$ trees at $P$ and then gone on to find the $\mathbb{T}^{3}$ trees at $Q$.

We could easily enough have written down $Q^{k+1}$ which, given $\mathbb{T}^{0}, \ldots, \mathbb{T}^{k}$ from an $x$ would have formulated definitions for $T^{*}\left(p_{2(k-1)}\right)={ }_{\mathrm{df}} \hat{T}\left(p_{2(k-1)}\right) \varnothing$, relevant $p_{2 k}$, and then asked if trees $\hat{T}\left(p_{2 k}\right)_{p}$ (being the current ${ }^{k+1} M$-least witness to the goodness of $\left.p \in T^{*}\left(p_{2(k-1)}\right)_{p_{2 k}}\right)^{\prime}$ and $\hat{T}\left(p_{2 k}\right)_{p}^{\prime}$ (the latter's subtree of non-losing positions for $I I$ ), that is the trees of $\mathbb{T}^{k+1}$, became eventually settled. The required definitions and stability questions are then entirely uniform in $k$. Hence the instructions for the programme $P_{e_{0}}$ on input an $x$ coding some $\left\langle k+1,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}, \mathbb{T}^{i}(i \leq\right.$ $\left.k),{ }^{k} M\right\rangle$ may be effectively written down in terms of $k$ and the given tuple of data. It is enacted by considering successive ${ }^{k+1} M$ structures, and by writing down theories $T_{\alpha}^{2}$ as before. The number of Cases to be considered at query $Q^{k+1}$ is $k+3$ : Cases $(0)-(k)$ result in a HALT at that level $\Lambda=k+1$, with an effectively determined $x^{\prime}$ to be passed up to the level $\Lambda=k$ above; whilst Case $k+2$ requires returning to $\Lambda=k$ and computing lengths of loops etc. The final Case $k+3$ is the one of eventual interest and triggers the query $Q^{k+2}$. Each $Q^{k+1}$ is officially a query of the form ? $\mathrm{eJ}\left(\left(e_{k+1}^{\prime}, x\right)\right)=0 / 1$ ? about how the next subcomputation loops, and we calculate the relevant $x$ from our data. The instructions that $e_{k+1}^{\prime}$ codes include of course those for calculating $e_{k+2}^{\prime}$ ready for the next query. However we may argue as below, that these calculations may be assembled into, or considered as, one whole calculation embodied in one $\varphi_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$.

In the following we let " $\forall^{*} \alpha<\Sigma \varphi(\alpha)$ " abbreviate "For all sufficiently large $\alpha<\Sigma \varphi(\alpha)$ ". We shall say " $T^{\prime}$ is stable up to ${ }^{k} \Sigma$ " to mean " $T^{L_{\zeta(M)}}=T^{L^{L^{+}(M)}}$ " for all sufficiently large structures $M$ with $\Sigma^{+}(M)<^{k} \Sigma$. This can be equivalently written as " $\exists U\left(\forall^{* k-1} \Sigma<^{k} \Sigma\right)\left[U^{\prime}=\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{L_{k-1_{\Sigma}}}\right]$."

For $0<l<k$ we shall say " $\mathbb{T}^{l}$ is stable up to ${ }^{k} \Sigma$ " to mean " $\exists \mathbb{T}^{l} \in L_{k_{\Sigma}}\left(\mathbb{T}^{l}=\mathbb{T}^{l}{ }^{L_{\Sigma^{+}(M)}}\right)$ " for all sufficiently large structures $M$ with $\Sigma^{+}(M)<^{k} \Sigma$, which, as we have indicated above, of course is taken, by a convention, to be a shorthand affirming that all the constituent trees of $\mathbb{T}^{l}$ are stable per their definitions up to ${ }^{k} \Sigma$.

In the above definition of the algorithm we are employing the following principle:

> Suppose $T^{\prime}$ is stable up to some ${ }^{k} \Sigma$, then
> for all sufficiently large ${ }^{k-1} \Sigma<^{k} \Sigma\left(\mathbb{T}^{1}\right.$ is stable up to ${ }^{k-1} \Sigma \&$ for all sufficiently large ${ }^{k-2} \Sigma<^{k-1} \Sigma\left(\mathbb{T}^{2}\right.$ is stable up to ${ }^{k-2} \Sigma \& \ldots$
> $\vdots$
> for all sufficiently large ${ }^{2} \Sigma<^{3} \Sigma, \mathbb{T}^{k-2}$ is stable up to ${ }^{2} \Sigma \&$ for all sufficiently large $^{1} \Sigma<^{2} \Sigma, \mathbb{T}^{k-1}$ exists $\left.) \cdots\right)$ ".


Figure 1 In this diagram $T^{\prime}$ is stable up to (but not beyond) $\Sigma_{3}$.

Less perspicuously but more formally we state this as:
Lemma 4.3. Suppose $T^{\prime}$ is stable up to some ${ }^{k} \Sigma$, then

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\forall^{* k-1} \Sigma<^{k} \Sigma\right)\left(\exists \mathbb{T}^{1}\right)\left(\forall^{*}{ }^{k-2} \Sigma<^{k-1} \Sigma\right) \\
& {\left[\mathbb{T}^{1}=\left(\mathbb{T}^{1}\right)^{L_{k-2}} \wedge\left(\exists \mathbb{T}^{2}\right)\left(\forall^{* k-3} \Sigma<^{k-2} \Sigma\right)\left[\mathbb{T}^{2}=\left(\mathbb{T}^{2}\right)^{L_{k-3_{\Sigma}}} \wedge\left(\exists \mathbb{T}^{3}\right)(\ldots) \cdots\right.\right.} \\
& \left.\left.\left.\ldots\left(\exists \mathbb{T}^{k-2}\right)\left(\forall^{* 1} \Sigma<^{2} \Sigma\right)\left(\mathbb{T}^{k-2}=\left(\mathbb{T}^{k-2}\right)^{L_{1_{\Sigma}}} \wedge\left(\exists \mathbb{T}^{k-1}\right)\left(\mathbb{T}^{k-1}=\left(\mathbb{T}^{k-1}\right)^{L_{1 \Sigma}}\right)\right]\right] \cdots\right]\right] .
\end{aligned}
$$

Proof: Formally by induction on $k$, but the reader may convince themselves of a representative case, say with $k=3$.
Q.E.D.

Note 4.4. The Lemma is really the formal counterpart of the description that precedes it. Note that the hypothesis here is fulfilled whenever ${ }^{k} \Sigma$ approaches some ${ }^{k+1} \Sigma$ : for sufficiently large ${ }^{k} \Sigma$ below ${ }^{k+1} \Sigma, T^{\prime}$ will be stable even beyond ${ }^{k} \Sigma$.

Also, by the usual $\Sigma_{2}$-reflection arguments, the above principles are equivalent to those obtained by replacing any string " $>^{l} \Sigma^{\prime}$ by " $<^{l} \zeta$ ".

As the program runs there will eventually be subcomputation calls to arbitrary levels, as it uses various trees for as long as they survive fulfilling their role. But only after $\alpha_{0}$ stages will we be certain that $T^{\prime}$ really does stabilize to its final value. Thereafter we shall have $\Lambda\left(e_{0}, T, \alpha\right)>0$. At a later point we shall have all the correct trees to apply the Main Lemma once, and these will survive. After such a point $\Lambda\left(e_{0}, T, \alpha\right)$ is greater than 1 . But only at $\beta_{0}$ do we first have $\operatorname{Liminf}_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta_{0}} \Lambda\left(e_{0}, T, \alpha\right)=\omega$ and so divergence.

It may already be apparent that the claim that there is an index number $e_{0}$ for the above generalized ittm-recursion can be established readily from the eJ-Recursion Theorem. One may argue as follows, somewhat schematically.

Let $F(0, e)$ code the actions of the main programme at (1) above, searching through increasing $M$-structures for a stable $T^{\prime}$. (The $e$ is just a dummy parameter at this stage.) With $T^{\prime}$ stabilized, the programme asks the oracle query ? $\mathrm{eJ}(i, x)=1 / 0$ ? about $x=\left\langle 1,\left\langle B_{n}\right\rangle_{n}, T, T^{\prime}, M\right\rangle$ with $i=F(1, e)$ to be defined next.

Let $F(k+1, e)$ be the function that returns the index code of the following blocks of computations:
(1) The actions to do to fulfill the query $Q^{k+1}$, as an explicit computation. As indicated above these can be listed effectively and the code of their formal instructions can be given as a function of $k-q(k+1)$ say. This includes the actions to compute the increasing structures and what to do if stability of any tree passed down subsequently fails. Also included are, if a stability point is reached that requires a new query to a lower subcomputation, the actions to collect together the current trees, to form part of a new coding real $x$.
(2) " $(x)_{0}:=(x)_{0}+1$ " [\% Increase the initial index of $x$ by $1-$ here to $k+2$.]
(3) The code of the query instruction: "? $\mathrm{eJ}\left(\varphi_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left((x)_{0}\right), x\right)=0 / 1$ ?".

Let the two instructions (2) and (3) have code together $t(e) \in \mathbb{N}$.
(4) The code of the post-query actions, on receipt of an answer (in the form of what to do if information is received of a certain kind of tree from a lower subcomputation becoming unstable etc). Again these are effective in $k$. Let these be $p(k+1)$ say.

We thus may loosely represent the total function $F(k+1, e)$ as:

$$
F(k+1, e)=q(k+1) \frown t(e) \frown p(k+1) .
$$

By the eJ-Recursion Theorem there is an index $e_{0}$, so that

$$
\varphi_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(k+1)=F\left(k+1, e_{0}\right)=q(k+1) \frown t\left(e_{0}\right) \frown p(k+1) .
$$

Then our overall computation is: $\left\{e_{0}\right\}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(\left\langle B_{n} \mid n<\omega\right\rangle, T\right)$.

As for the outcome we have as a final claim:

Claim: For $A=\bigcup_{n} B_{n} \in \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ and $T$ a recursive subtree of ${ }^{<\omega} \omega$ as above, the programme $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(\left\langle B_{n}\right|\right.$ $n<\omega\rangle, T)$ will either halt with a code for a strategy for I, if such exists, or else will diverge. In the latter case if it diverges after $\beta$ steps, then a strategy for II is definable over $L_{\beta}$.

Proof: We first observe that the master programme (at $\Lambda=0$ ) cannot enter an eventual loop: suppose $(\zeta, \Sigma)$ was its first looping pair of ordinals. Then the level of computation at times $\zeta$ and $\Sigma$ is the same: $\Lambda(\zeta)=\Lambda(\Sigma)=0$. But the argument of Claim 1 of Lemma 4.2, shows that we must have stability of $T^{\prime}$ by any extendible ordinal $\zeta$, and hence, by the specification of $e_{0}$, must be at a level $>0$ at time $\zeta: \Lambda(\zeta)>0$. The same argument shows that even with $\Lambda(\zeta)=\liminf _{\alpha \rightarrow \zeta} \Lambda(\alpha)=0$, we should have $T^{\prime}$ diminishing unboundedly below the 2 -extendible $\zeta$ - which cannot happen.

So the computation either halts or diverges. However divergence can only happen if there is an infinitely descending chain of query calls $Q^{k}$. And such has been designed only to happen when we have complete stability of all our definable trees necessary for the proof of the existence of a definable winning strategy for II over $L_{\beta}$ - as our procedures mimic. Lastly the main programme can only halt if it produces a winning strategy for $I$.
Q.E.D. Theorem 4.1

Hence by the latter case of the last Claim, strategies for II in such games are in general not even semi-recursive in eJ.

Corollary 4.5. There is a procedure $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ that only diverges at $\beta_{0}$.
Proof: Let $A=\bigcup_{n<\omega} B_{n} \in \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ be such that $G(A ; T)$ is a win for II, but there is no winning strategy in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. Then the computation $P_{e_{0}}^{\mathrm{eJ}}\left(\left\langle B_{n} \mid n<\omega\right\rangle, T\right)$ above can only diverge at $\beta_{0}$ since a winning strategy for II is definable over $L_{\beta_{0}}$ but no earlier.
Q.E.D.

- An example of such a game, of the type above, is where II must construct an $\omega$-model of "KP + $\operatorname{Det}\left(\Sigma_{3}^{0}\right)$ ", and $I$ as usual must find a descending chain of ordinals in II's model. Then II has an obvious winning strategy, but there cannot be one where II produces a model with wellfounded part an ordinal smaller than $\beta_{0}$. We saw in the proof of the theorem above that the computation in a game of this type, continually constructs codes for the levels of the $L$-hierarchy unboundedly in $\beta_{0}$, - and hence is ultimately divergent. We thus have:

Corollary 4.6. There is a program code $f$ so that $(i) P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(x)$ computes codes for levels for the $L[x]$ hierarchy; (ii) $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(0)$ is divergent, but is not divergent at any stage before $\beta_{0}$, whilst computing codes for levels $L_{\alpha}$ for $\alpha$ unbounded in $\beta_{0}$.

Corollary 4.7. $\eta_{0}=\tau_{0}$ - that is Theorem 2.11 holds.
Proof: We have that $\alpha_{0}=\eta_{0}$. By modifying the program of the last Corollary we can find programs $P_{f}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(0)$ which halt cofinally in the admissible set $L_{\alpha_{0}}$, and hence with ranks of such computations unbounded in $\alpha_{0}$. Hence $\tau_{0} \geq \alpha_{0}$. By the Boundedness Lemma $3.15 \tau_{0} \leq \alpha_{0}$.
Q.E.D.

Lemma 4.8. Let $a \subseteq \omega$ be in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. Then $a$ is eJ-recursive.
Q.E.D.

The following answers a question of Lubarsky:
Corollary 4.9. The reals appearing on the tapes of freezing-ittm-computations of [12] are precisely those of $L_{\beta_{0}}$; similarly the supremum of the ranks of the wellfounded parts of divergent computation trees is $\beta_{0}$.

Proof: Freezing-ittms computations are, in the terms here, divergent iJ-computations. As eJ is recursive in iJ we shall have that the iJ-recursive reals and the eJ-recursive reals coincide. These will be the reals of $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. By the Boundedness Lemma all such computations are divergent by $\beta_{0}$, whilst at the same time codes for levels of $L$ for $\alpha<\beta_{0}$ appear on some $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}$ s tape. Hence the reals appearing on the divergent iJ-computations are those of $L_{\beta_{0}}$.
Q.E.D.

Corollary 4.10. The complete semi-decidable-in-eJ set of integers

$$
K=\{(e, m) \in \omega \times \omega \mid \mathrm{eJ}(e, m)=1\}
$$

is recursively isomorphic to a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set.
Proof: If $P_{e}^{\mathrm{eJ}}(m)$ is convergent it must be so before $\beta_{0}$ : its convergence is a $\Sigma_{1}$-fact true in $L_{\beta_{0}}$. By $\Sigma_{1}$-reflection, it is true in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$. Hence the $\Sigma_{1}$-fact of its convergence is mentioned in the $\Sigma_{1}-\operatorname{Th}\left(L_{\alpha_{0}}\right)$. That is $K \leq_{1} \Sigma_{1}-\operatorname{Th}\left(L_{\alpha_{0}}\right) \equiv{ }_{1} S$ where $S$ is a complete $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ set. The latter holds by Theorem 2.17. For the converse, we have that $n \in S$ if there is a certain strategy in $L_{\alpha_{0}}$ for a certain game which is winning for $I$. Such can be found by inspecting the various $L_{\alpha}$ for $\alpha<\alpha_{0}$. And Corollary 4.6 enables us to run a computation which is convergent if such can be found. Hence $S \leq_{1} K$. Q.E.D.

## Proof of Theorem 2.9

The last Corollary proves the (a) (i) iff (iii) direction of the Theorem, and we have already established (a)(ii) iff (iii) (in the proof of Theorem 2.17). This leaves (b). But this follows from the usual characterisation of the semi-recursive and co-semi-recursive sets as being recursive, the admissibility of $L_{\alpha_{0}}$, and that $\alpha_{0}=\eta_{0}$.
Q.E.D. Theorem 2.9

We may also recast the above arguments as showing:
Corollary 4.11. Both the theory $T_{\alpha_{0}}^{1}$ and $K$ are $\partial \Sigma_{3}^{0}$-inductive sets of integers.
Remark 4.12. The same considerations show that in fact the whole of $\operatorname{dom}(\mathrm{eJ}) \cap \omega \times \omega^{<\omega}$ is $\partial \Sigma_{3^{-}}^{0-}$ inductive.

The proofs of Theorems 2.7, 2.9, and 2.11 are now complete (and they cover the statements of the Theorems 1.5-1.8 in Section 1 of the Introduction).

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